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Abstract
The Thesis studies moral hazard problem in teams. We consider team production
models where incentive can be provided through explicit sharing and relational
contract. Incentive provision is discussed under various information structures.
Under deterministic production, the output itself act as a strong signal of deterring
shirking, thus noisy soft signal would not help to improve efficiency. While in
cases where soft information is sufficient to infer agents’ effort, we show that the
optimal sharing would concentrate negative sharing on one agent who will be fully
motivated by relational incentive.
We further studied a model with sub-teams where sub-team performances are
deterministic signals to sub-team members’ effort. The value of the certainty in
the soft information crucially depends on the structure of the sub-teams. Once
we can ensure some heterogeneity between the organizational structure within the
sub-teams, strongest relational incentive can be provided to cope with unilateral
deviation. A necessary and sufficient condition for implementing a target effort
level is then provided under general sharing. However, once we restrict the sharing
rule to be linear, utilities among agents are no longer transferable. We show that
linear sharing can implement the efficient effort, but with more restrictions on
surplus distributions among agents. In general, linear sharing can be applied
without loss of generality only if the surplus distribution is relatively balanced.
Finally we had some preliminary discussion of non-monetary incentive provision
based on inequality aversion model on linear public good games. Applying Fehr
and Schmidt [1999]’s model with Bayesian game technique, we explore a boarder
range of equilibriums with positive contributions. However, equilibrium behavior
relies on how inequality is defined among players, future theoretical and experi-
mental work needs to be done to enable inequality aversion as a tool of incentive
provision.
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Numerous firms constitute a corporate structure as such that is engineered to
ensure the primary interests of shareholders. Over the past few decades, the con-
ventional notion that a firm’s ultimate goal is to maximize share value for its
shareholders has dominated economic thought and processes. However, the detri-
mental consequences instigated by the 2008 financial crisis, prompted a serious
reconsideration of these ideals, instead proposing an alternative economic philos-
ophy. Other issues were brought into the spotlight, for instance the maximization
of shareholder value may incentivize shareholders to adopt a greater risk deci-
sion making process, which would consequently further intensify the insecurities
of debtors, taxpayers and the wider economy as a whole. As a result, in response
to the model of shareholder primacy, this dissertation attempts to seek an alterna-
tive approach in the form of ”team production” which many scholars consider of
fundamental importance in understanding how corporate self-interested objectives
can generate social and economic spillovers.
1
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Team incentive problem has long been studied, but lack progress compared to
other areas in incentive theory. In the early literature, team production is defined
as ” production in which (1)several resources are used; (2) the product is not a
sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource; (3) not all resources used in
team production belong to one person.” The above characteristics form the basic
benchmark for all later studies of team production, although sometimes people
relax the second condition and assume linear production technology for simplicity.
Unlike the principal-agent problem which strongly emphasis the share value (the
principal’s benefit), the team production problem deals with a more symmetric
relationship. Each team member is expected to exert effort while the residual
claimant is not pre-attributed to anyone. Thus, the principal-agent problem can
be treated as a special case of the team production problem where (in most cases)
the principal does not need to exert effort and claims all the residuals, in the mean
time the agent is hired by the principal who gets a conditional wage based on the
produced output.
Moral hazard arises when effort cannot be directly contracted upon. When team
members’ payoff can only contingent on the final output, i.e the contracted shar-
ing rule, there will be incentive for some team members to free ride on other’s
effort( Holmstrom [1982]). Holmstrom [1982] also shows that if the output will
always be fully distributed among team members, efficient outcome can never be
achieved. Intuitively, each team member only receive a fraction of the total out-
put, any team member will not be fully benefitted from an increase of effort from
himself nor will he be punished fully from an decrease of effort from himself only.
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A solution provided by Holmstrom introduces the idea of budget breaking. In
the solution, efficient outcome is achieved through a scheme such that the whole
team will get punished if the output is under certain threshold. This requires the
whole team giving away some surplus though some mechanism. To overcome the
enforcement problem of such contract, Holmstrom [1982] introduces a special role
into the team setting - the ”principal” or budget breaker whose job is to break the
budget and punishing the whole team when the output is low.
Another idea investigated by McAfee and McMillan [1991] looked the case the
other way round: Instead of breaking budget through punishing the whole group
ex-post, each agent would be receiving 100% share of the production and the
principal balances the budget through taking fixed payments from agents ex-ante.
According to McAfee and McMillan [1991]’s solution, the principal can merely act
as a third party money keeper and should not be able to influence the production
by any means.
Both of the above contracts work based on the fact that they provide strongest
incentive possible to agents, on the other hand budget balancing shift all the
negative incentives to the principal who in theory don’t exert effort and thus have
no incentive problem. These two models indeed provided a neat solution towards
moral hazard problem in teams, but the role of the principal has suffered lots of
criticisms. As the principal does not involve in the production himself and can
only get positive payoff when the output is low. Eswaran and Kotwal [1984] shows
it may give the principal incentive to sign some side-contracts with one or more
team members making them benefit from producing a low output.
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When the special principal is removed from the team, most of the nice properties
of the optimal contract would collapse. To improve efficiency, the contract has
to utilize more information other than the final output level. Without doubt,
when a group of people working together, they should have a general idea on how
hard working each others are. These kind of information, although might contain
noise, can be used in contracting as long as they bring in useful information on
agents’ effort. However, such information, if written in contracts, will face a crucial
obstacle in the implementation, that is the verifiability of such information.
In most cases, the additional information can be observed by team members only.
Thus writing a contract with unverifiable information would signify that no third
party will be able to enforce the contractual parties to follow what the contract
specifies. Just as how meaningless it is to condition the contract on a variable
whose value cannot be objectively evaluated. However, this problem has recently
been tackled by the so called relational contract, which tries to take advantage of
soft information that cannot be verified and eliminate the necessity of the third
party enforcement.
In reality, most contractual relationships are long lasting, making the incentive pro-
vision more complicated than in the static setting. The well known folk theorem
states that if a game is played infinitely repeatedly, for large enough discount-
ing factors, any outcome that can gives players’ payoffs larger then their minmax
payoffs can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. In a way we know what can
be achieved but folk theorem does not answer how can it be done. In infinitely
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repeated games, the threat of falling back to a ”bad” equilibrium will give motiva-
tions to players to keep on the ”good” equilibrium path. When applied to contract
theory, the above idea forms the bases of implicit contracting which is also called
relational contract ( Levin [2003]).
Although contracts only specify the rights and obligations of the contractual par-
ties, the effectiveness of the contracts must rely on the ability of a third party, often
the court, to enforce them. Relational contract studies the enforcement problem
in incentive theory, pointing out that the court might not be able to enforce every
agreement in a contract. For example in a team setting, each team member may
have a better idea of everyone’s contribution than the court does, writing explicit
contracts with respect to the contribution of each individual may lead to distortion
in incentive provision. It is often observed that, the payments in team contracts
are only conditioned on the final output, while any bonus or punishment is done
through the inner regulation system in which the third party is not involved. The
infinite repeated game framework enables firms to condition payments on soft in-
formation that cannot be verified by the court. However certain conditions must
be met to make sure the implicit understanding between contractual parties will
indeed be executed.
The growing focuses on relational contracts shed light on team moral hazard prob-
lem. The enforcement problem in the static game can be mitigated by relational
contract while the principal is not a must to break the budget. Moreover, more
complicated contracts can be utilized providing more possibilities in getting closer
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to the first best outcome, without need to consider the enforcement ability of the
court in reality.
While relational contract provides another direction in studying traditional team
moral hazard problem, some recent empirical and experimental findings should
not be neglected. The standard economic theory was developed under an im-
plicit assumption that individuals only care about their own interest, on the other
hand Fehr and Schmidt [1999] shows it’s not always the case. Human beings
are not machines that work for a purely pre-determined purpose, sometimes indi-
viduals’ decision making involves in emotional factors that are not counted into
classical economic theory.
It has been consistently observed in different experiment that people dislike in-
equality. Such preference, named inequity aversion, means that people will feel
envy when getting less than their companions while feel guilty when earning more
than their colleagues. Fehr and Schmidt [1999] models inequity aversion and builds
into the principal-agent model. However, we may doubt that in an asymmetric
relationship between principal and agent, would the principal’s payoff be observ-
able to the agent? Particularly if the incentive provision under inequity aversion
would be costly, the principal may mask his payoff and leave it unobservable to
the agent.
We find it may be more appropriate to study inequity aversion under symmetric
relations. Moreover, surveys of employee opinions within firms have shown that
employees compare not only relative salaries, but also relative performance against
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that of co-workers. To account for inequity aversion, there is need to build not
only relative payoffs but also relative performance in individuals’ utility functions.
The three topics we described above represents the main themes we are going
to analyze in this dissertation. However, the theory of inequality aversion are
developed based on basic experiments i.e. dictator game, public good games.
Whether the existing theory can be applied to more complicated circumstances is
unknown. Before we develop any team-relational contract theory with inequality
aversion, more theoretical and experimental work needs to be done. Thus in this
dissertation we would use two chapters to analyze relational team contract and a
separate chapter as a preliminary discussion on inequality aversion theory and its
implication for future study.
Relational contract in teams
Rayo [2007]’s model provides us a benchmark to analyze relational team contract.
We would start with similar settings and investigate some interesting areas that
remain to be explored. We would first follow Rayo [2007]’s path supposing the team
maximize its total surplus, while adding two different variations in the assumptions
that we are interested in. We first consider the case with deterministic production
with stochastic individual performance signals, to see if the additional signals
could add anything to the model. Typically we will compare trigger strategy that
depends only on the deterministic output with relational contract that can depend
on both hard and soft information. We find that aggregate hard information would
be sufficient to obtain the first best outcome, while noisy soft information would
not add anything more. The second aspect we want to explore is what the linear
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assumption on the sharing rule plays in the model. Due to its simplicity, linear
sharing is widely used in partnership and team contracts. But can such simple
sharing be optimal? Is the practical advantage of linear sharing is at the cost
of efficiency? Such questions need to be looked into more carefully. We would
follow Rayo [2007]’s discussion under non-deterministic production, while we no
longer put any restriction to the sharing rule. The results show that using linear
sharing rule is without loss of generality when first-order approach is valid, however
the optimal sharing structure might vary if we allow negative sharing. All these
discussions will be presented in chapter 3.
Inspired by the value of certainty we have found in chapter 3, we asked ourselves
another question: is there a way we can get other soft information without noise?
Apparently it’s very unrealistic to assume we can get perfect effort signal under
individual level. But we will be able to construct sub-teams among the agents
and get deterministic sub-team performances Nandeibam [2002]. In chapter 4 we
will study a new relational team contract model with sub-team structure. We are
typically interested in the following issues:
• How can we design the organizational structure of the team such that the
sub-team performances can be utilized to the maximum in relational con-
tracting.
• The optimal relational incentive under the previous sub-team structure.
• The efficiency that can be achieved under the combination of explicit sharing
and relational incentive.
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• The optimal linear sharing rule.
• The comparison of linear sharing with general sharing and the limitations of
linear sharing
The most striking finding is that, once we restrict the sharing rule to be linear,
the utilities among agents will no longer be transferable. Namely we cannot freely
distribute team’s surplus with linear sharing. Thus, what Rayo [2007] has been
solved under linear sharing rule is only a special case with utilitarian social welfare
function. It would be very interesting to see how general sharing is different from
linear sharing and to what extend. We will spend some paragraphs together with
a numerical example to have a detailed discussion over this issue in chapter 4.
Inequality aversion
Among all the experiments over other regarding preferences, linear public good
is the one that is most similar to team production problem. Our theory model
would be based on Fehr and Schmidt [1999] and Fehr et al. [1997]’s model of linear
public good experiments. However, we point out two assumptions that are not
very realistic under their experimental framework and try to develop new theoret-
ical insights over the model. First assumption Fehr and Schmidt [1999] applies is
that players’ preferences over inequality are publicly known to everyone. This is
a very strong assumption especially under experimental circumstances where sub-
jects don’t know who they are cooperating with. In chapter 5 we would assume
that the parameters representing agents’ preferences towards inequality are private
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information. But the distribution of each parameter are independent and identi-
cally distributed across all players and publicly observable. Another assumption or
approach used by Fehr and Schmidt [1999] is that inequality aversion is calculated
based on individual contribution levels even when the players’ contribution vector
will not be revealed. Thus we tried to redefine the inequality aversion based on
the public information and see how the equilibrium behavior would differ. As a
preliminary work, we will also point out the direction for future studies, especially
the experimental variations we are interested in.
As discussed above, team moral hazard problem, relational contract and inequity
aversion form the basic elements in this dissertation. Although the theory has
been developed for some time, there are still wide ranges of issues remain unin-
vestigated. A study on recent literature also indicates a need to combine all the
three elements together to conduct a research in team incentive problem, which
is the main objective of this dissertation. The content of thesis is arranged with
the following order: the second chapter will review all the relevant literature; the
third chapter which act as a foundational chapter will formally introduce the idea
of team relational contract based on Rayo [2007]’s model with several extensions;
The fourth chapter where our main results lie, will have a detailed discussion over
the team organization structure, efficiency and sharing rules with relational con-
tract; the fifth chapter is a preliminary theoretical chapter for future experimental
studies, we will analyze Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s inequality aversion model with
Bayesian game approach; the last chapter summarizes our findings.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter summarizes the literature1, both classical and recent ones, on moral
hazard in teams, relational contract and inequity aversion.
In a simple model with one principal and one agent, we know that moral hazard
problem is solved by conditioning the agent’s wage on the final output. When the
principal does not exert effort, the efficient outcome for the economy as a whole
can be maintained at a cost from the principal side. However, in team production
where every team members are supposed to contribute towards the final output,
incentive provision may be very hard and tedious, especially when the total output
generated by the team is the only information that can be measured and contracted
upon. In this case, free rider problem arises when the share of output is the only
source of incentive ( Holmstrom [1982]).
1Here we only include general review of the relative literatures, for more discussion on detailed
topics please refer to each chapters respectively.
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When team members’ payoffs are expressed as functions of the output, we describe
the set of functions across all members as the sharing rule within the team. A
sharing rule is balanced if the share received by each agent can be summed up
to the final output, namely the output will be fully distributed among the team
members under balanced sharing. Holmstrom [1982] shows that under balanced
sharing rules, each agent will be willing to exert first-best effort if and only if the
agent received a full share of the output. Otherwise agents’ would always have
incentive to shirk. As the efficiency loss by shirking will be shared among all team
members while the agent who shirks saves the full effort cost.
Therefore Holmstrom [1982] suggested a punishing scheme which solves the incen-
tive problem by introducing a principal who doesn’t exert effort into the team.
No matter who shirks, the principal will be able to punish the entire group based
on the output level. However, this heavy punishment makes the principal benefit
from project failure which makes him prefer the agents to shirk. Thus the en-
forcement of such budget breaking scheme has been doubted. The moral hazard
problem arises on the principal’s side that he can collude with one agent making
him shirk( Eswaran and Kotwal [1984]).
Apart from the budget-breaking scheme, relative performance measure or tour-
nament is widely used. In firms that use internal promotion as incentives, the
principal could create a pool of rewards, and each agent’s reward would be purely
based on his performance ranking. Since the total payment from the principal
is fixed, the principal can no longer take advantage of information asymmetry to
make himself better off in this case. Moreover, Green and Stockey [1983] shows
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that this mechanism can be very close to optimal when the number of workers
doing the same job becomes sufficiently large, the ranks of the workers become an
effective and accurate evaluation of their effort.
An obvious shortcoming of relative performance evaluation is that it introduces
competition among agents and discourages cooperation ( Mookherjee [1984]). Itoh
[1991] studied a slightly different model where the agents’ tasks are affected by
independent and privately observable noises but they can help other workers ac-
complishing their tasks. If each agent’s wage depends only on how well he can
accomplish his own task, he will not spend effort to help others since it’s costly
to him while bringing in no benefit. But the principal can use joint performance
evaluation and create conditions to get the agents help each other.
The above results are established in a static framework such that no future in-
teraction between the contractual parties are considered. However, in reality,
employment relationship and partnerships are often long lasting which makes re-
lational incentives a possibility in incentive provision. In other words, people’s
decisions are not only affected by current payoffs but also by the future interest,
i.e. reputation. The long-lasting nature of contract and infinite-repeated game
framework serves as the benchmark of self-enforcing contracts or relational con-
tract, where incentives are provided through the future gains from continuing the
relationship.
The early literature on incentive theory focuses on asymmetric information where
principal is not able to observe certain characteristic of the agent. Through de-
signing a contract contingent only on the observable variables, the principal can
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give the agent some incentive to do what the principal desires at a cost which
must be taken into account. There is an important implicit assumption that the
contract once signed, there will be a third party to enforce both contractual parties
to practice their commitment. However, in the real world the enforcement relies
heavily on the verification ability of the court. In other words, although something
can be observed by the contracting parties, it may not be possible for a third party
to verify it, or the verification is costly. In this case, the contract has to involve
some implicit understanding that must be self-enforcing.
In the principal-agent relational contract model, a principal employs an agent
who chooses a costly effort level (action) which is positively correlated with the
expected output. Neither output nor effort the agent spent can be verified by a
third party. Therefore, an explicit contract cannot be signed since the court is
unable to verify it. In such case, can any bonus or punishment be exercised in
order to give incentive to the agent? The answer is yes. The relational contract
specifies a discretionary incentive payment either from the principal or from the
agent, together with the outcome if anyone reneges on the discretionary payment.
The threat of getting into a bad outcome onwards helps to enforce the execution
of such payment. Levin [2003] introduces a self-enforcing constraint under which
incentive can be implemented. The so called self-enforcing constraint says that if
the agent exert the target effort level, the principal must be willing to pay any
bonus to the agent and in the meantime the agent must be willing to pay any
penalty to the principal. This constraint also gives the limitation on the incentive
can be provided.
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Assuming risk neutrality, optimal relational contract has the nice property of being
stationary ( Levin [2003]). In the moral hazard model in Levin [2003], where the
agent’s performance is not perfectly objectively measurable, the form of optimal
contract is rather monotonous: the principal sets a fixed payment and adjusts this
base payment according to the output. If output exceeds some level, he pays more
to the agent and if output is below this level, he pays less. Risk neutrality allows
the principal to set the strongest incentive. However, self-enforcement itself sets
the boundary of punishment and reward. The reason is that, the value generated
from continuation of the relationship is limited, thus the reward and punishment
to the agent is limited.
Parties cannot contract on the imperfect objective performance measures, even
though in a relational contract they can rely on self-enforcement to agree with
them. In practice, subjective measurement is widely used to alleviate the distor-
tions caused by imperfect objective measures ( Baker et al. [1994]). Levin [2003]
modeled subjective performance measures assuming the principal can privately
observe a noisy signal of the agent’s performance which is not based on objective
measures the agent can observe. When the principal subjectively evaluates the
agent’s performance, the usage of such measure may be abused - principal may
understate the agent’s effort and lower the transaction he should make to the
agent.
To make the principal honestly evaluate the agent’s performance, Levin [2003]
proposed a system called full review contract under which the principal must
provide a full performance evaluation at each period based on all existing historical
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information. That is, all private information is revealed after every period. Since
both parties face the threat of terminating the relationship, the principal therefore
is discouraged from under-evaluating the agent’s performance. Levin [2003] proved
that an optimal full review contract must make the same transaction at each period
whilst permitting some possibility that the parties renege and break the contract.
However, efficiency loss becomes inevitable even in the optimal contract.
Researchers have long been studying the use of subjective evaluation in incentive
contract, although hardly can they find a better way to achieve an efficient out-
come.2 Some argue that internal mediation helps to resolve disputes caused by
different beliefs in performance through narrowing the space of disagreement and
helps to maintain relationships ( Carver and Vondra [1994]). Baker et al. [1994]
proposed a combine use of explicit contracting and implicit contracting to achieve
positive payoff while neither of the two alone can yield positive payoff.
With subjective evaluation, MacLeod [2003] shows that the optimal contract en-
tails the use of more compressed evaluations relative to the case with verifiable
performance measures. By introducing a special mechanism to agents’ such that
they are able to conduct a costly punishment to the principal whenever they feels
the principal’s assessment is unfair, MacLeod [2003] shows the contracting cost
can be further reduced.
Kambe [2006] studied a situation where, the principal has the option to choose ob-
jective measurement or subjective measurement, once the objective measurement
is made, then the payment will not be influenced by the principal’s subjective
2Unlike objective performance measure, parties may have different beliefs on subjective per-
formance measurement, which causes distortion in players’ behavior.
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measurement. He shows that contracts involve subjective component only when
subjective measurement is sufficiently accurate or only subjective measurement is
available, despite the possibility that it may be abused.
Maestri [2012] compares bonus payment verses efficiency wage under subjective
evaluation. In bonus payment contract, the agent receives a bonus after each
period based on the subjective measure of performance made by the principal, the
agent uses his private information to review the principal’s reward, the agent quits
the relationship once he feels his performance is undervalued. In efficiency wage
contract, the agent receives a high fixed wage and faces the threat of being fired
if the output is low. Maestri [2012] shows that bonus-payment contract always
dominates efficiency-wage contract and bonus payment is asymptotically efficient
which means it can converge to first best outcome.
Most of the results are derived under the typical framework with only one agent
and the accepted wisdom in using subjective performance measure will actually
lead to efficiency loss once parties disagree on the measure. However, there is
a well known situation where subjective measurement is successfully applied in a
situation with multiple agents - tournament. The principal fixes the total payment
to the agents, and each agent receive a payment based on his rank among the team.
Since the total payment is fixed, the principal has no incentive to under-evaluate
the agents’ performances.
Based on the existing literature of team moral hazard, Rayo [2007] extends Levin’s
model by introducing implicit relational incentive into a team setting with profit
sharing and shows how implicit and explicit contract interact. Rayo [2007] studies
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two situations where effort is either perfectly observable or can only be observed
as a noisy signal. Rayo [2007] shows that under the first situation, the optimal
contract divides the output to all team members. On the other hand, if effort
signal is sufficient noisy, profit sharing and relational incentive become perfect
substitution with each other, the optimal contract thus concentrate all output into
one of the team members who is more difficult to provide implicit incentive to, and
all other team members receive only relational incentives. Although Rayo [2007]
said the model is budget balancing, he introduced a special individual who does
not exert effort. This individual plays the exact role of the principal in Holmstrom
[1982], providing the possibility of breaking the budget when output is low.
When considering repeated agent-interaction with implicit contracting, joint per-
formance evaluation can be utilized since it equips the agents with tools to punish
their colleagues and reduce the principal’s cost of providing incentives ( Che and
Yoo [2001]). Kvaloy and Olsen [2006] showed that the optimal incentive scheme is
determined by the productivity of agents: the higher the productivity of agents
the more frequently relative performance evaluation is used.
All the previous results are obtained under one important assumption that agents’
strategies form a Nash equilibrium. However in repeated team work, the agents
may coordinate their actions or may even form collusive strategies, especially in rel-
ative performance measure scheme. If the agents’ payments are totally conditioned
only on their ranking in the team, they can collude and jointly be better off while
spending low effort. Principal’s exogenous wage scheme thus have no use since
the agents’ form an endogenous wage allocation. Kvaloy and Olsen [2006] studied
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the problem of collusion caused by the relative performance payment scheme. In-
terestingly, the basic results remain the same. For sufficiently high productivity
the relative payment scheme is still optimal even with an allowance for collusion.
However, the possibility of collusion among agents increases the cost of relative
payment scheme leaving more possibility for joint performance measure.
Although classical economic theory assumes that individuals are self-interested
and maximize their own utility while having no consideration of other’s well being,
more and more empirical and experimental findings do not confirm this view. It has
been widely found that people have fairness concerns and want to be treated fairly.
Economists have long been studying how to incorporate these physiological find-
ings into modern economic theory. Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], Fehr and Schmidt
[1999] proposes inequity aversion models where inequality in payoffs causes disu-
tility; people whose payoff is lower feel envy and whose payoff is higher become
altruistic. Rabin [1993] studies an intentions-based model where people judge mo-
tivation from the outcome and tend to help those who treat them well and hurt
those who treat them badly. Suggesting agents care more about bad outcomes
caused by other players actions rather than the nature. There are other researches
introducing social norms into fairness concerns ( Huang and Wu [1994]).
As discussed above, inequity aversion plays an important role in people’s decision
making and should be brought into consideration in incentive provision. People
with inequity aversion tend to take strategies that increase equity among groups
or within society. Although strict equal allocation is rarely seen in the real world,
people would prefer an equal allocation when total group profit becomes irrelevant
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in their utility functions ( Engelmann and Strobel [2004]). Two kinds of games
are often used in the study of inequity aversion, the dictator game where subjects
have no incentive to transfer any amount of money and the ultimatum game where
subjects have no incentive to reject money. When assuming inequity aversion,
however, they will spontaneously transfer and reject money which is entirely away
from the prediction of classical theory.
To build up contract theory with inequality aversion, it’s essential to determine
how can inequality aversion be represented in people’s utility functions. Economists
model inequity aversion in different ways, one is self-centered inequity aversion pro-
posed by Fehr and Schmidt [1999]. The inequity aversion in their model comes
from comparison with others. Such individual centered inequity aversion may be
affected by the environment. If players can sanction other group members, even
though only a minority of group members has inequity aversion, fair outcome can
be achieved. Another well known model was presented by Bolton and Ockenfels
[2000], quite similar to Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s model, but in B Bolton and
Ockenfels [2000]’s model the relative magnitude of parameters that determine the
intensity of inequity aversion are influenced by the tension between profit max-
imization and social comparison. Rabin [2002]combined these two models into a
two-person, three-parameter model which functions in a similar way of the previ-
ous two.
Among all the experiments exploring players’ preferences towards inequality aver-
sion, we are typically interested in the linear public good model. Since linear
public good game can be viewed as a special case of team production where the
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output is equally shared among all agents. When building inequality aversion into
the linear public good model, Fehr and Schmidt [1999] found that cooperation
exists but with low contribution levels unless a punishment scheme is introduced.
This provides a vivid example on how inequality aversion can be utilized to enforce
good outcomes. However, the model made several strong assumptions we would
like to relax in this dissertation. Thus we would further polish the theory model
before we apply it to team incentive provision.
While there do exist literatures about team contracts with other regarding prefer-
ences. Itoh [2004] studies the inequity aversion between agents in standard team
contract, inspiring us to extend our focus to inequity aversion in implicit contract-
ing. However, the existing literature on this issue is restricted either to determin-
istic production technologies, binary effort decisions or the focus of their analysis
is not on inequality aversion but envy, i.e. the worker cares only about being worse
off and not about being better off. However, empirical and experimental evidences
have confirmed the effect of altruism on human behaviors.
Inequity aversion brings distortion to incentive provision in one-period setting. In
relational contract, inequity aversion affects incentive compatibility and individual
rationality in the same way as in standard team moral hazard model, however,
it may enable the principal to provide less incentive to make the contract self-
enforceable. For agents with inequity aversion, reneging brings them larger utility
loss compared with self-interested agents.
Chapter 3
Relational Contract in Team
Production and Linear Sharing
Rules
3.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with moral hazard problem in teams. Although existing lit-
eratures established abstract sharing rules that has been proved to be optimal,
complicated sharing structure are hardly seen in reality. Most team and partner-
ship contracts we observe are linear, which merely specifies proportional shares
for each participant and some times constant transfer of payments. One possible
explanation of the contradiction from theory to application is that complicated
22
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contracts are more difficult to be enforced. No matter how clear a contract is un-
derstood by the contractual parties, without enforcement from the legal system,
it is powerless.
Built upon the previous works by Holmstrom [1982] Levin [2003] and Rayo [2007],
this chapter tries to fill the gap of Rayo [2007]’s research. We first investigate the
usage of relational contracting under deterministic production. We showed that
in deterministic case, the noisy soft information does not play an important role
in contracting, the final output is strong enough to deter possible deviation in
effort level among agents and trigger strategy can be used by depending trigger
on the final output. Since the self-enforcing property limit the level of punishment
in relational contracts, we show that under certainty, trigger strategy based on
output itself weakly dominate relational contract.
The latter half of the chapter follows Rayo [2007]’s model, while trying to relax
the linearity and non-negative assumptions Rayo [2007] made to the model. We
first justify the optimality of linear sharing rule when first-order approach is valid
and negative shares are not allowed. We then move on to allow negative sharing,
by discussing the validity of first-order approach with negative shares. We find
the optimal sharing would have a special ”franchising principal” who plays a very
different role compared with Rayo [2007]’s result. However, the conditions asserted
by Rayo [2007] is not sufficient enough to ensure the validity of first-order approach.
Little is known about what conditions are needed to ensure first-order approach
can be applied in a team case.
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3.2 The Model
We consider a team with n members who take part in a joint production repeat-
edly. At the beginning of each period, each team member i simultaneously decide
whether or not to participate in the production process. Let dti ∈ {0, 1} denote the
participation decision for each team member i at each period t. For an individual
i who is willing to take part in the production at t, we have dti = 1 and d
t
i = 0
otherwise. For the production to take place at period t, we require that all the




At the beginning of each period t, the agents sign a court-enforceable agreement,
which specifies: the participation decisions for all agents2 and how the final output
will be shared among all the participating agents. Let St denotes the sharing rule3.
Then each team member takes an unobservable action ati ∈ R+ which incurs a
cost ci(a
t
i) to the individual i. The cost is increasing, differentiable and convex
in ati. The action of all the team members a
t = (at1, a
t
2, . . . , a
t
n) ∈ R+n jointly
determines the final output Y t according to a production function f : R+n → R+.
The production function f is increasing, differentiable and concave in the team
members’ actions at.4 At the same time, each team member’s action produces a
noisy signal li which is publicly observable but cannot be verified by a third party.
1This is not uncommon in partnerships where every member is crucial. However, in multi-
agent models it may not be the case.
2If an agent decides to participate in the production in period t, then positive effort is expected
from this agent and we assume there exist technology to tell whether an agent shirks completely
(0 contribution).
3Here we would treat the generation of the sharing rule as an external procedure which will
not be considered in the game. It can possibly suggested by one agent or several agents jointly,
or it can be an outcome of group negotiation.
4Here we implicitly assume that the production function is stationary through out the time
period.
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Assume the signals following the same conditional density function g(li|ai) among
all team members, with c.d.f G(li|ai). The outside option for each individual is
denoted by p¯ii.
At each period t, each team member observes the output Y t but cannot observe
others’ actions. The production function, the sharing rule and each member’s cost
functions are common knowledge. Each team member i’s pay-off under a sharing





The total surplus of the team is given by:






In each period, the greatest surplus the team will be able to achieve is: Π∗ =
maxY t −∑i ci(ati), we denote this surplus as the first best surplus and the action
vector a∗ = arg max{Y t −∑i ci(ati)} denotes the first best action vector. Here we
focus on Rayo [2007]’s routine to provide an extensional research under a wider
range of situations, while the discussion of whether utility is still transferable with
relational contract will be left to the next chapter5
5 Rayo [2007] assumes the utility is transferable between agents and therefore he can focus
on maximizing the total surplus without worrying about how the surplus need to be distributed
among agents. However if agents’ utilities are not transferable, there will exist some outcomes
that are strictly preferred by some agents while not maximizing total surplus.
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3.2.1 Linear Sharing Rule
Here we would restrict our attention to a special kind of sharing rule which is most
commonly seem in real life - linear sharing rule.
Definition 3.1. A sharing rule S : R → Rn, where n = 2, 3, . . . is said to be
linear if:
1. For any Y ∈ R, the share to each team member i has the following struc-
ture: si(Y ) = αiY + βi, where αi and βi are constants or functions that are
independent of Y , where the share is non-negative: αi ≥ 0.
2. The budget is balanced such that
∑
αi = 1 and
∑
βi = 0.
The definition says, a linear sharing rule contains two parts, for each team member
i it specifies a portion αi of the output which must sum up to 1 and a constant
income/payment βi which must sum up to 0. The simple structure of linear sharing
rules makes them easily enforced by courts. Moreover, by using a linear sharing
rule the team members are pretty sure that the shares they get si(Y ) is monotone
increasing with the output Y , since S ′i(Y ) = αi ≥ 0.
However, the incentive provided by linear sharing rule is not strong enough to
produce the first best outcome ( Holmstrom [1982]). This is due to the fact that
any agent’s shirk will save his/her effort cost fully while the negative impact on
the output will be shared with others. If we stick to balancing the budget, the
punishment from a linear sharing rule can never be strong enough to achieve an
efficient outcome. In the static model in Holmstrom [1982], the action vector
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of the team aˆ constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if for each i, aˆi solves
max si(f(ai, aˆ−i))− ci(ai), subject to for each i, individual rationality is satisfied
that is pii ≥ p¯ii.
3.2.2 Infinite Repeated Game and Relational Contract
With the refinement of perfect equilibrium, we are pretty sure that the efficiency
can be improved when a game is played infinitely (although first-best efficiency
might still not be achieved). The threat of falling back to the non-corporative
static equilibrium gives incentive to every team member to maintain a corporative
outcome for each period. This idea of implicit cooperation is introduced to con-
tracting which is referred to relational contract ( Levin [2003]). In a relational con-
tract, terms can be enforced implicitly other than explicitly (i.e. through a court),
providing more flexibility of contracting. The long-term benefit from keeping to
a productive relation can prevent players pursuing short-term interests through
deviating. A relational contract contains the following elements:
1. A court-enforceable sharing rule. If the production occurs at period t, a for-
mal contract specifying how the output will be shared should be established.
If the sharing rule is linear, it then contains a share variable αt and a fixed
income/payment βt.
2. A discretionary payment p. Since the payment is discretionary, pmay depend
both hard and soft information. Still, the budget within the team must be
balanced such that
∑
pti = 0 for each t.
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3. The effort level each team member should take.
4. An action dt for all the team members specifying whether or not to join the
production at period t.
5. An action ϕt for all the team members specifying whether or not to make
the discretionary payment at period t.
6. The behavior after any of the team members renege. If one of the players
renege, it’s natural for his opponents minimax this member’s pay-off, that is
the trade been terminated and everyone receives their outside option, even
though this punishment is costly (all the other team members will only have
their outside options themselves afterwards).
Note that we are currently focusing on deterministic case where the actions each
team member makes determine a value of joint output. For non-deterministic case,
which will be discussed later, team members’ actions determine a distribution
rather than a value of output.
Let H t = {h1, h2, . . . , ht} denote the pubic history at beginning of period t,
ht = {Y t−1, St−1, lt−11 , . . . , lt−1n , pt−11 , . . . , pt−1n , dt−11 , . . . , dt−1n , ϕt−11 , . . . , ϕt−1n } denote
the public information from the end of period t − 1 to the beginning of period
t, and define h1 = ∅. We say a relational contract is self-enforcing if for any
public history, they are willing to execute the discretionary payment pti, that is
ϕt1 = · · · = ϕtn = 1
Thus, a self-enforcing relational contract must satisfy the following constraints:
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1. All team members must gain at least much as their outside options, that is for
all i,
pii ≥ p¯ii (3.3)
2. The target effort level is implementable, that is IC constraints must hold. For
all i and t,
ati ∈ arg maxE[Sti (yt) + pti(H t, lt, yt)− c(at′i ) +
δ
1− δpii(H
t, lt, yt)|H t, at′i , at−i]
(3.4)
3. All team members are willing to implement the discretionary payment pti in all
period t:
pti(H
t, lt, yt) +
δ
1− δpii(H
t, lt, yt) ≥ δ
1− δ p¯ii (3.5)
The individual rationality constraint 3.3 is a necessary condition for the production
to initiate. Constraint 3.4 states the decision problem each team member faces
when choosing the optimal effort level: the action they choose must not only
maximize the current payoff which includes the share of output, the discretionary
payment and the cost of effort but also the influence on future payoffs ( as future
payoffs can contingent on public history ). Constraint 3.5 says that if a is to be
sustained as equilibrium, then every team member must prefer to pay or receive
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the discretionary payment and remain the relationship (LHS) than to renege and
receive outside option onwards (RHS).
Since the fixed payments do not influence the incentive compatible constraints, Levin
[2003] states that we can first focus on maximizing the total surplus without con-
sidering the individual rationality constraints, the fixed payment can be used to
redistribute the output to make sure every team member get at least as much as
his/her outside option without affecting the incentive provision.
Lemma 3.2. If an optimal relational contract exist, then there exists a stationary
contract that is optimal.6
Proof. . See Appendix A
With lemma 3.2 we can now focus on stationary relational contract without loss
of generality. An optimal stationary relational contract can be described as: For




subject to the following constraints for each i:
ai ∈ arg maxE[si(yt) + pi(lt, yt)|a′i, a−i]− c(a′i)
6The proof of the lemma to the non-deterministic case is similar, the proof would hold by
substituting output y into expected output.





t, yt) ≥ δ
1− δ p¯ii
Note that although the enforcement of a relational contract also depends on the
game being played infinitely, the incentive provision has significant difference to-
wards explicit contracts. In a stationary relational contract, incentive is paid
through discretionary payment period by period. Namely, everything is solved in
the current period and self-enforcing constraint makes everyone willing to carry
out the discretionary payment to each other in fear of breaking the long-run ben-
efit. While in an explicit contract, payment can only be contingent to verifiable
output y. The folk theorem tells us that when a game is played infinitely, players
will work cooperatively to a more efficient outcome in the fear of falling back to
the worst static equilibrium. In team setting, Winter [2009] shows that once the
production function is concave, increasing one agent’s target effort level would not
distort the incentive provision to other agents. In our model, each team member’s
incentive can be divided into two parts: the share of the output and the discre-
tionary payment. Let the difference of payment δv denote as the power of implicit
incentive.7
7Since for any given y and l, the discretionary payment must sum up to 0 across all agents.
Thus we can generalize the expected discretionary payment on the equilibrium path as 0 and
focusing on solving the payment function off the equilibrium path, as only the incentive power
matters
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3.3 Deterministic production: Trigger strategy
In deterministic case, although the output y doesn’t tell us any information on
who reneges, it is sufficient to deter any deviation on effort. Hence, y is enough
for conduct punishment strategies in infinitely repeated game, we can construct
the following trigger strategy based on the output y
Theorem 3.3. With deterministic production, for sufficiently large discount fac-
tors, there exists a set of feasible sharing rules under which first-best outcome can
be achieved by taking advantage of trigger strategy. The contract is characterized




1 if yt−1 ≥ y(a∗)
0 if yt−1 < y(a∗)
, while a∗ is the first-best effort level.
Proof. See Appendix A
The idea of terminate the relationship share some similarity of Holmstrom [1982]’s
punishing the whole group. By assuming that the production cannot take place
if any one of the team members does not participate, we would ensure that the
enforcement is robust to any side-contract or collusion. Note that the theorem
also holds even if we relax the assumption that the production needs involvement
from all the n members. Even termination is costly to other individuals who do
not shirk, they will still stick to the strategy to enforce the best outcome.
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We also notice that both trigger strategy and relational contract’s incentive provi-
sion comes from the value of continuation. We would formally compare these two
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. With deterministic production, if a∗ can be implemented by a re-
lational contract, it can also be implemented by trigger strategy.
Proof. See Appendix A
Theorem (3.4) shows that under certainty, relational contract is weakly dominated
by trigger strategy. As in deterministic case, the output level becomes a perfect
signal on reneging on effort level of the whole group and trigger strategy provides
the harshest punishment to the whole group compared with the relational con-
tract. Thus in deterministic case, the design of relational contract would not be
very useful. However, when we continue to investigate under the uncertainty of
production, things can be different. The most significant advantage of relational
contract under uncertainty is: production can always be continued. While for
trigger strategy, no matter where the threshold of trigger is set, there are always
possibilities of stopping the production even if no one reneges. In the following
section we will continue Rayo [2007]’s discussion on the relational contract under
uncertainty, but focus would be on the sharing rule.
In general, trigger strategy provides a sample of how severe the punishment of
deviation can be in the most extreme case. Conducting trigger strategy automat-
ically ends the relationship and thus binds the self-enforcing constraint. However
we do not like to see relationship end due to pure stochastic factors that are not
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controllable by agents. In this sense we may use trigger strategy in deterministic
setting, but in certain circumstances, relational contract would be more preferable.
3.4 Non-deterministic production: Sharing rule
in relational contract
In this section we assume the output is randomly determined by the effort level a,
all the properties of the production function in the previous section now applies to
the expected output function E[y|a]. With uncertainty, the output level would no
longer be sufficient enough to tell whether any agent shirk on the effort, thus the
individual signal can be valuable and we shall discuss the design of the relational
contract. As Rayo [2007] has discussed the optimal implicit incentive given linear
sharing, we would continue our discussion on the optimal explicit incentive given
the following assumptions hold:
Assumption 3.1. The performance signal l is a sufficient statistic for a relative
to (y, l)
This assumption ensures that the discretionary payment can be expressed as a
function of l without loss of generality.
Assumption 3.2. The discretionary payment pi(l) is additively separable: pi(l) =
wi(li) + ui(l−i)
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As l−i are independent on ai, for every agent i, the term ui(l−i) in IC constraint
can be treated as a constant. Therefore we can simplify our IC constraints to the
following:
For each i
ai ∈ arg maxE[si(y)|a′i, a−i] + E[wi(li)|a′i]− c(a′i)
Assumption 3.3. The first-order approach is valid for any non-negative sharing
rule.
We take this setting from Rayo [2007], however we shall point out that the condi-
tions provided by Rayo [2007] are not sufficient to show the validity of first-order
approach. Rayo [2007] asserted the following two conditions in his paper:
Condition 3.1. For all values of ai, the likelihood ratio
gai
g
(li|ai) is increasing in
li
Introduced by Mirrelees [1976], assumption 3.1 is also called the Monotone Likeli-
hood Ratio Condition (MLRC). This assumption ensures that ai has a monotonic
impact over li, in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. Thus the discretionary
payment wi will be increasing with li.
Condition 3.2. G(li|ai = c−1(z)) is convex in z for all li
This assumption is a relaxed version of Rogerson [1985]’s convexity density func-
tion, which ensures the concavity of term E[wi(li)|a′i] − c(a′i) in IC constraint.
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Intuitively the density function G(li) is decreasing in ai, as the more effort agent
exerts, the lower the probability that the signal li will be less or equal to a certain
level. The assumption guarantees that the marginal impact of effort on signal,
after netting the cost, will be decreasing.
However, the sufficiency can only be proved under single agent setting, namely
when only one IC constraint need to be considered. Little has been studied of
which conditions are needed for the validity of first order approach under team
and multi-agent setting ( Kim and Wang [1998]).
Assuming first-oder approach, we can replace the IC constraints with their FOCs.
We would then show the minimum implicit incentive needed for target effort a∗
given sharing rule s.
Lemma 3.5. Given target effort level a∗ and sharing rule s, if first-order approach
is valid, the optimal wi takes the following form:
wi(li) =










Proof. We first show that the one-step payment functional form stated in equation
(3.6) is optimal.
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When assessing agent i’s effort level given signal li, we construct the following
hypothesis test:
• H0: ai ≥ a∗i
• H1: ai < a∗i
By the optimal Neyman-Pearson detection rule, we reject the null if and only if
gai(li|a∗i ) ≤ 0. Thus it’s optimal to punish agent i when gai(li|a∗i ) ≤ 0.






max{0, gai(li|a∗)}dli =′ (a∗i ) (3.7)





Lemma 3.5 is a general case of Rayo [2007]’s Lemma 3 without assuming linearity
in the sharing rule. At this stage we only focus on the optimal discretionary
payment function wi with effort level and sharing rule given. The discussion of
the self-enforcing constraint will be left after the revelation of optimal sharing rule.
Theorem 3.6. If an optimal relational contract is described by S = (s1(.), . . . , sn(.))
and u(.) targeting effort level a∗, there exist a linear sharing rule such that for each






and βi = E[si(y)|a∗]−αiE[y|a∗] that
is also optimal
Proof. See Appendix A
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By proving the optimality of linear sharing rules, we justify the linearity assump-
tion Rayo [2007] has made to his model. The optimality of linear sharing depends
on the validity of first-order approach, however it’s not clear what sufficient con-
dition is needed to ensure the assumption.
We would now focus on the negative sharing extension to Rayo [2007]’s model.
Let τi = P (ui(li) 6= 0|a∗) denote the probability that agent i’s signal will satisfy
condition gai(li|ai) > 0. Term
∫
max{0, gai(li|a∗)}dli can be written as dτidai
Fixing the amount of incentive provided to each agent, it’s shown by Rayo [2007]
that the marginal rate of substitution between explicit incentive and implicit in-





. While the amount of explicit incentive is limited
by the budget balancing constraint, the optimization sharing rule should minimize
the implicit incentive needed due to the self-enforcing constraint. When shares are
non-negative, it’s trivial that shares will be concentrate to one agent who is the
most difficult to be provided with implicit incentive ( Rayo [2007]) and all other
agents receives no explicit incentive.
However, this sharing structure would collapse as soon as we allow negative shar-
ing. Once agent’s shares are no-longer bounded by 0 below, efficiency can be easily
improved by reducing shares for agents who are easier to be provided with implicit
incentive. Yet there is a special case under which the optimal sharing can still be
positive even when we relax the non-negative sharing constraint.





is the same, then
any arbitrary non-negative linear sharing rule is optimal.
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Proof. See Appendix A
Lemma 3.7 provides a condition under which the design of sharing rule is not
important as the self-enforcing constraint will not be affected by the choice of the
explicit sharing rule. Therefore, under this special case whether allowing negative
sharing does not matter.
However, for other cases when the sharing rule does matter and very likely negative
sharing is needed to improve efficiency, we need to answer one question before
searching for the optimal sharing rule. That is: Is first order approach is still
valid? If not, then linear sharing may no longer be optimal. Dropping the non-
negative sharing assumption doesn’t mean the sharing is unbounded, rather it’s
having a wider range such that for all i, αi ∈ [2− n, 1]. The lower bound suggests
that the minimum sharing an agent can get is 2−n, when all other agents receive
100% share of the output.
Given α and a∗, the second order derivative for agents’ payoff function with respect
to their effort level ai is stated as below:
hi = αi(E[y|a∗])′′ + viτ ′′ − c′′(ai) (3.8)
Lemma 3.8. The marginal impact of αi on hi is monotone.
Proof. See Appendix A
Since the marginal impact of share on the second derivate of payoff function is
monotone, if this impact is non-negative, then the second order condition will
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always satisfy even with negative shares. This requires the highly concavity of
τ . On the other hand if ∂hi
∂αi
< 0, due to the monotonicity, for each agent i there
exist a [αi]min such that first order approach is still valid for αi > [αi]min. For a
special case if [αi]min < 2 − n for all i, first order approach will still be valid for
the optimization problem.
Depending on the value of ∂hi
∂αi
, αi will be bounded below either by 2 − n or
[αi]min, we would then focus on the case when the validity of first-order approach
is guaranteed, the optimal sharing structure can be extended to the other case
applying different lower bound.
Theorem 3.9. When first-order approach is valid and negative sharing is allowed,
the optimal sharing would have the following property:




, αi = 2− n




, αj = 1
Proof. See Appendix A
Theorem 3.9 provides a completely contradictory solution to Rayo [2007] where
sharing can only be non-negative. However, they do share a similarity such that the
optimal sharing would make agents’ shares binding to the two extremes. According
to Rayo [2007], when negative sharing is not allowed, there is one agent who is the
most difficult to be provided with the implicit incentive gets the full share of the
output while all other agents’ shares automatically binds to 0 due to the budget
balancing constraint. However, when negative sharing is allowed, theorem 3.9
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shows that more than one agent can get a full share, and there exist one (maybe
more) agent who is the easiest to be provided with implicit incentive, concentrate
all the negative shares and will be fully incentivized by relational contract. As
comparing with this agent, it would be costly to provide implicit incentive to
other agents and intuitively they will be receiving explicitly incentives only and
negative sharing allows every other agent been fully motivated.
There are two key ingredients deciding who could be receiving a negative share:
the marginal productivity of effort and the quality of the performance signal. The
higher the marginal productivity the more effective explicit incentive would be.
While the more volatile the performance signal, the more difficult it would be to
provide the agent with relational incentive. Thus the agent who receive negative
share must be less marginally productive while has a stronger and less noisy effort
signal. To further illustrate our result consider the following examples
Example 3.1. Consider a team consists of agents 1, 2 and 3. Let a = {a1, a2, a3},












3 . Each agent’s cost function is defined as
follow: c1 = a
2
1/2, c2 = a
2
2/2, c3 = a
2
3. Suppose the effort signal li follows the same
conditional density function across all i . If we target the first best effort level
a∗ = {1, 1, 1}. The marginal impact of each agent’s effort on the output will be
1, 1 and 2 respectively. Given the fact that these agent’s effort signal are equally
noisy and agent 3’s effort has larger marginal impact on output level than the
other two agents, if we decrease agent 3’s share, it would require a higher amount
of relational incentive to compensate for the loss in incentive power. According to
theorem 3.9, minimizing the amount of relational incentive would make agent 3
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get a full share of the output, while the other agents would get the rest. By theorem
3.7, the marginal rate of substitution of explicit and implicit incentive is the same
across agent 1 and 2, how they share the output really doesn’t affect the result as
long as their shares sum up to 0 such that α1 + α2 = 0. In this typical case, if
the negative sharing is not allowed we would have a unique optimal sharing with
α1 = α2 = 0 and α3 = 1, which is also exactly what’s suggested by Rayo [2007].
If we allow negative sharing then we could let agent 1 get the negative share while
other agents get the full share, with α1 = −1 and α2 = α3 = 0. The only difference
between our result with Rayo’s is that in Rayo [2007]’s case only one agent is not
receiving implicit incentive while in our case, there will only be one agent receiving
implicit incentive.
Theorem 3.9 also shed light on the possibility of monitoring, if there is a technique
to accurately measure an agent’s effort8, then it would be worthwhile to conduct
monitoring as this is obviously possible for one agent. From organizational struc-
ture perspective, whether this agent is or not contributing to the project doesn’t
matter, teams can always set up a job that the effort inputting can be easily
measured. This typical agent act like a ”team franchiser”, the only difference is
the payment to franchiser is made discretionally and after the output has been
generated. In a way this special agent is more like a principal comparing to Rayo
[2007], as the effort can be provision of asset while no actual labor effort is needed
from this agent. For example the special agent provides a ”recipe” of this typical
food and a team is formed to formally produced and sell the food to the market.
Theorem 3.9 shows that with relational contracting, the solution to moral hazard
8Or make the effort signal less noisy.
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problem in teams only need the revelation of one agent’s effort level, and this
agent act like a real principal in terms of the nature of the work it’s been specified
endogenously by the model.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the utilization of relational contract in both deterministic
and non deterministic production. We showed that in the deterministic case the
output level becomes a perfect signal on detecting reneging within the group, that
the trigger strategy, which provides a means to punish the whole group on the con-
tinuation payoff, would weakly dominate the relational contract, which utilize the
individual effort signal. While in non-deterministic case, we follow the discussion
of Rayo [2007]. Based on Rayo [2007]’s result on the optimal relational incentive,
we showed that the linear sharing rule is optimal. Furthermore, we discuss the
optimal share agents would receive. When allowing for negative sharing, agents
who are the easiest to be provided with implicate incentive will be motivated by
implicit incentive only and usually receiving a negative share. The other agents





In the previous chapter, we discuss the impact of stochastic individual performance
signal in relational contracting. In large institutions however, it might be costly
even just to make everyone’s performance signal to be public information. This
chapter will thus investigate an alternative setting, where we no longer focus on
getting extra information from individuals. Rather, we would group the agents into
sub-teams based on the tasks they are assigned to. Sub team performance then
becomes the soft information we can utilize in relational contracting. Restricting
the dimension of signal vector would also make deterministic signaling possible.
44
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The emphasis of the chapter will be put upon the sub-team structure and the
properties of the optimal sharing rule.
When modeling sub-team structure, we follow the deterministic model of Nan-
deibam [2002]. Here we extend the literature by introducing repeated agency
with relational contracts to the model. Also, we formally define the classifica-
tion mechanism between agents and sub-teams to further study the impact of the
organizational structure on relational contracting.
We show that to allow precise punishment been fallen to the agent who shirks (any
agent who deviate from the target effort level will definitely be punished implicitly)
without breaking the budget, we can follow a simply criteria to form the sub-teams.
The only requirement is: there must exist at least some heterogeneity between the
sub-teams on organizational structure. Without being limited by the production
technology, this allows us to implement a straightforward mechanism to detect
who can result in a deviation without bringing the suspicion to the whole team
(in which case it’s unlikely to ensure the agent who shirks will be punished while
keep budget balanced).
With the relational incentive been properly defined with the optimal grouping
mechanism, we then focus our attention to the explicit incentive. We first analyze
the necessary and sufficient condition for an outcome to be implemented with
general sharing. We show that when each agent’s share can be designed point-
wise, utility will be transferable and we can always maximize the team’s total
surplus first and then distribute in any desirable way within the team.
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We further compare the implementation under linear sharing with general sharing.
As a key assumption adopted by Rayo [2007], linear sharing is widely seen in real
world due to its simplicity. However the practicality of linear sharing is at the
cost of freedom of distributing the surplus. We show that, with linear sharing
agents’ utilities are no longer transferable. Implying the optimal sharing depends
on the social welfare function of the team. If the team only cares about the total
surplus, then linear sharing would work just fine. On the other hand, we find that
linear sharing would not be able to implement the efficient outcome specified by
general sharing when the surplus is distributed very unevenly, i.e. principal-agent
framework. All our result will be further visualized by a numerical example.
4.2 The model
We consider a production team that consists n agents, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be
the set of agent. Each agent i ∈ N can choose an effort level ai ∈ R++1. We first
investigate a deterministic production technology based on the joint effort level of
all agents a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Rn+.
On top of the team structure, the team members are further grouped into m sub-
teams. Denote set S = {1, 2, . . . ,m} as the sub-team set, we define the grouping
mechanism as follows:
1Here we rule out the possibility of agents spending 0 effort because it’s not a very interesting
case. If an agent’s optimal strategy is to spend no effort, it might be either due to low marginal
productivity of the agent or low incentive payment within the team. It can be a two-sided
screening problem in the team formation stage and will not be discussed here.
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Definition 4.1. A grouping mechanism is a function G : S → P(N)/∅, where




It’s possible that two different sub-teams been mapped to the same subset of N.
This counts for the fact that, although a same group of people works together,
they might produce multi-dimensional signals. For simplicity we would separate
them and treat them as different sub-teams to ensure the sub-team performance
to be single dimensional.
The grouping information G is a soft information that is only known within the
team but cannot be verified by outsiders. After being attributed to their sub-
teams, each team member i can take an action ai from his/her action space
Ai, which incurs a cost ci(ai) to the agent. The team members’ actions a =
(a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ A jointly determined each sub-team’s performance. For each







< 0 for all i ∈ G(j); ∂fj
∂ai
= 0 for all i /∈ G(j).
Namely, each team member can only influence the performance of the sub-team(s)
they belong to. The output of the team F is strictly concave for all values of a .
At the end, each member gets a share of the output F as his/her payoff, according
to a pre-determined sharing rule S. For any agent i, let si(F) denote the monetary
payoff he can get from output F . Within the team, budget must balance, that is,
n∑
i=1
si(F) = F .
Without considering any enforcing problem, the sharing rule can depend on any
public information. We say a sharing rule S sustains an effort vector a if for all
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i, ai ∈ arg max si(F , f1, . . . , fm)− ci(ai) . Each agent i has an outside option p¯ii
which represent his/her payoff if not participate in the production. The team’s










si(F , f1, . . . , fm)−−ci(ai) ≥ p¯ii
ai ∈ arg max si(F , f1, . . . , fm)−−ci(ai)
We denote the solution of the above problem (F s, as) as the static optimal solution,
S as the set of all balanced sharing rules that sustains as as Nash equilibrium.
4.3 Relational contract
Nandeibam [2003] has shown how efficient outcome can be achieved by utilizing
sub-teams’ performances together with the grouping information G. In most cases,
although the team members are aware of the sub-teams’ outputs, it’s difficult for
an outsider to verify them. When sub-team outputs become soft information,
all sharing rules in S that depend on sub-team performance will no longer be
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implementable in static situation. Thus, we introduce the concept of relational
contracting to cope with the enforcement problem.
We define our relational contract the same way as the previous chapter, however
our information set would look slightly different. Let d denote the action for all the
team members specifying whether or not to join the production, τ be the action
for all the team members specifying whether or not to make the discretionary
payment, H t = {h1, h2, . . . , ht} denote the history information within the team at
beginning of period t,
ht = {F t−1, St−1, f t−11 , . . . , f t−1m , pt−11 , . . . , pt−1n ,




1 , . . . , ϕ
t−1
n }
denote the public information from the end of period t − 1 to the beginning of
period t, and define h1 = ∅. We say a relational contract is self-enforcing if for
any public history, they are willing to execute the discretionary payment pti, that
is ϕt1 = · · · = ϕtn = 1.











2Here I multiply the surplus by 1− δ to take the per-period average surplus so that this can
be compared with the surplus in the static game.
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For each i, t and H t
sti(F(ati, a−i) + pti − c(ati) ≥ p¯ii
ati ∈ arg max sti(F(ati, a−i) + pti − ci(ai) +
δ
1− δpii(H











Lemma 4.2. If the optimal contract exist, there is a stationary contract that is
optimal
Proof. See Appendix B









si(F(ai, a−i)) + pi(f1, . . . , fm)− ci(ai) ≥ p¯ii (4.1)
ai ∈ arg max si(F(ai, a−i)) + pi(f1, . . . , fm)− ci(ai) (4.2)
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For any values of (f1, . . . , fm),




1− δ p¯ii (4.3)
Note that the self-enforcing constraint (4.3) has to hold for every possible values of
sub-team performance. As the IC constraint relies on the fact that any punishment
due to striking on effort can be enforced, if self-enforcement is merely defined on
the performance on the equilibrium path, the relational contract would not work.
As a mechanism to redistribute team surplus on top of the sharing rule, the implicit
transfers can be designed from two aspects; first, given the production information,
who should we punish, who should we reward? Second, how severer(high) should
we punish(reward) them?
The first aspect is directly related to the information structure, or more precisely
speaking, the grouping mechanism G. The key issue is, if an agent shirks, can
we make sure that this agent is punished. As suggested by Holmstrom [1982], the
easiest thing to do is to apply the punishment to the whole team by introducing
an outside budget breaker. If we are to keep the budget balanced within the team,
other mechanisms are required.
Definition 4.3. Given a group mechanism G, a monitoring scheme that aims
at detecting agent’s deviation in effort can be described as a function: hG :
Rm → P(N). We say a monitoring scheme fails if for some values of (f1, . . . , fm),
hG(f1, . . . , fm) = N .
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For all target effort level a∗ and any agent i, we say a monitoring scheme is perfect
if for any a′i 6= a∗i , i ∈ hG(fi(a′i, a∗−i), . . . , fm(fi(a′i, a∗−i)) 6= N
Monitoring scheme is basically a mechanism to detect ”who could be the one”
when shirking occurs (based on sub-team performances). The condition for perfect
monitoring implies that any agent’s deviation given his/her peer effort level will
make him/her been suspected while it’s impossible for any agent to make the
monitoring information totally useless.
Theorem 4.4. There exist a perfect monitoring scheme if
m⋂
j=1
G(j) 6= N .




G(j) 6= N , we will create a monitoring scheme that is perfect.
we first classify the agents into two groups A and B: for any agent i ∈ N , if ∂fj
∂ai
= 0
for at least one j ∈ M then i ∈ A; if ∂fj
∂ai
> 0 for all j ∈ M then i ∈ B, such that
agents are classified based on whether they have influence over all sub-teams.
The monitoring scheme is defined as follows:
hG(f1, . . . , fm) =

∅ if for all j ∈M :fj = fj(a∗),





G(k) if for some j ∈M :fj 6= fj(a∗)
(4.4)
, where M ′ = {j|f ′j 6= fj(a∗)}
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With this monitoring scheme, for any agent i, if i ∈ B, a deviation from a∗i would
result in f ′j 6= fj(a∗) for all j ∈ M , so that i ∈ hG = B. Given
m⋂
j=1
G(j) 6= N , it’s
easy to verify that B 6= N .
If i ∈ A, a deviation from a∗i will result in f ′j 6= fj(a∗) where i ∈ G(j) while
f ′k = fk(a
∗) for all k that i /∈ G(k). As i ∈ ⋂
j∈M ′
G(j) while i /∈ ⋃
k/∈M ′
G(k), we have
i ∈ hG. Since ⋃
k/∈M ′
G(k) 6= ∅, hG 6= N .
Theorem (4.4) provides a weak but practical condition to ensure the existence
of perfect monitoring scheme under deterministic case, that is, there are at least
some structural difference among the sub-teams. In extreme case where each sub-
team contains the whole team members, the sub-team structure is collapsed into
a normal team framework with multi-dimensional output. However our focus is
trying to get the best outcome possible and have solved for the ”optimal” sub-
team structure. From now on, we will assume G satisfies
m⋂
j=1
G(j) 6= N and let h∗
denote an arbitrary perfect monitoring scheme.
Example 4.1. To see how the monitoring scheme (4.4) works, consider a simple
team with 3 agents 1, 2 and 3 together with 3 sub-teams A, B and C where the
grouping of the sub-teams are described as follows: G(A) = {1, 2, 3}, G(B) =
{1, 2, 3}, G(C) = {2, 3}, notice the condition in theorem (4.4) is met. And we can
check any individual’s shirking on effort will lead him been punished and at least
one other team-member can balance the budget.
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If agent 1 shirk, it would lead to sub team A and B’s performance different from
the target. According to the third case in the monitoring scheme, we first take the
union of the team-members of sub team A and B to get all the possible agents who
could result in the outcome which are agents 1, 2, 3 together. Then we exclude the
agent that’s impossible to shirk, from the fact that sub team C’s performance is as
expected, agent 2 and 3 cannot shirk, in this case agent 1 will be punished.
If agent 2 or 3 shirks, then all the sub teams’ performance would be different from
target, from the monitoring scheme then punishment will only be conducted on
agents who have influence on all sub teams. If either of agent 2 or 3 shirks, the
monitoring scheme would punish both agent and let agent 1 balancing the budget.
With monitoring scheme, we restrict the number of agent we shall punish. The
question then is to decide how we should punish them under the self enforcing
constraint (4.3). Our next objective is to find the optimal level of punishment by
maximizing the incentive power while ensuring the contract is self-enforcing.
With the perfect monitoring scheme, we will demonstrate the derivation of the
optimal implicit incentive in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.5. For any sharing rule S and target effort vector a∗, for any agent
i the following discretionary payment function
pi =

0 if hG(f1, . . . , fm) = ∅,
δ
1−δ (p¯ii − pii) if i ∈ hG(f1, . . . , fm),
wi(h) if i /∈ hG(f1, . . . , fm) 6= ∅
(4.5)
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where w(h) ≥ 0 will be optimal.
Proof. See Appendix B
Since the perfect monitoring scheme ensures the punishment of shirking will indeed
fall on the agent who shirks, and budget can always be balanced, we are able to
create the strongest relational incentive to the agents. The relational incentive
can be specified as follows, if the final output equals the target output level,
everyone receives 0 transfers. If someone shirks, then all agents been selected by
the monitoring scheme will be fully punished, namely, binding the self-enforcing
constraint where each agent i ∈ h will get a negative transfer equal to δ
1−δ (p¯ii−pii),
while for all the other agent j /∈ h they won’t get punished and will merely act as
budget balancers with pj ≥ 0.
4.4 Efficiency under general sharing rule
The previous section discussed the provision of relational incentives. We showed
that with perfect monitoring scheme, the implicit incentive can take a simple one-
step functional form. The discretionary payments that contingent on sub-team
performances will punish all agents who might shirk to the maximum. Given











i )p¯ii]. In this section, we will try to discuss the efficiency with general
sharing rules.
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For each i and any a′i 6= ai
si(F(ai, a−i))− ci(ai) ≥ si(F(a′i, a−i))− ci(a′i) +
δ
1− δ (p¯ii − pii) (4.6)
, where pii = si(F(ai, a−i)) − ci(ai), rearrange the equation we have the new IC
constraint:
1
1− δ [si(F(ai, a−i))− ci(ai)] ≥ sup[si(F(a
′
i, a−i))− ci(a′i)] +
δ
1− δ p¯ii (4.7)
Fix the payment each agent i receives at F∗ as qi, where
n∑
i=1
qi = F∗. Each agent’s
surplus pii = qi− ci(a∗i ). Let Θi denote the set of all the possible output level with
unilateral deviation by agent i, namely Θi = {θ|∃aˆi such that θ = F(aˆi, a∗−i)}.
Since we are focusing on Nash equilibrium where only unilateral deviation will be
considered in incentive provision. For any realization of output level Fˆ /∈ ∩Θi, we
can easily find a balanced sharing rule that punish some agents that might have
caused the outcome as severe as possible. Thus we would focus our attention to
the sharing rule for output level F ∈ ∩Θi.
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Let Θ = ∩Θi, for each θ ∈ Θ, let ai(θ, a∗) denote the effort agent i may have
exerted to produce the output level θ given other agents’ effort as a∗−i. We have
F(ai(θ, a∗), a∗−i) = θ. Similarly we define the possible effort cost for agent i as
vi(θ, a
∗) = ci(ai(θ, a∗)). The condition for implementability of a∗ can be summa-
rized as the following theorem:

















Proof. Necessity: If a∗ can be implemented, there exist a sharing rule s(.) =
(s1(.), . . . , sn(.)) such that
qi − ci(ai) ≥ si(θ)− vi(θ) + δ
1− δ (p¯ii − pii) (4.9)














The inequality thus holds for ρ as well.









p¯ii, for each θ, we have
inequality 4.10, rearranging the terms we have:













(p¯ii − pii) (4.11)
Thus for each θ, there exist balanced sharing s(θ) = (s1(θ), . . . , sn(θ)), such that
for each i
qi − ci(a∗) ≥ si(θ)− vi(θ, a∗) + δ
1− δ (p¯ii − pii) (4.12)
Thus, IC constraints hold with sharing rule s(.) and a∗ can be implemented
Theorem 4.6 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for an effort level to be
implemented by a relational contract with abstract sharing rules. However this
only holds under general case where no restriction is put on the functional form
of the sharing rule. The flexibility enables us to find proper values for si(θ) across
all i and θ. The result thus holds for any distribution of final output (q1, . . . , qn),
where for each i, qi − ci(a∗i ) ≥ p¯ii.
4.5 Linear sharing rule
As a general assumption throughout Rayo [2007]’s model, linear sharing is the
most commonly seen sharing in real life because of its simplicity. However, whether
linear sharing can be optimal is not clear. The restriction makes our search for
optimality much easier but the comfort might be on the cost of efficiency. Thus in
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this section we would try to disclose whether anything is lost by assuming linearity
in the sharing rule.
From now on we would assume linear sharing and search for the optimal linear
sharing to see if there is any efficiency loss by putting linearity restriction on the





In general sharing, we need to specify shares for each agent and each output level.
However for each individual we only need to solve two parameters. With linear
sharing constraint 4.7 would be affected by both parameter α and β, the utility
among agents are no-longer transferable. Any constant transfers of output will
affect individual IC constraints. Thus, the maximization of total team surplus
can only support certain distribution outcomes under linear sharing. In this sense
if we restrict to linear sharing rules, maximizing team surplus is merely a typ-
ical case with a specific social welfare function. While there might exist other
outcomes that some specific agents might prefer while don’t maximize the team
surplus. Which social welfare function the team would choose depends on the
organization structure, it might be principal-agent structure where there is one
agent who dominates and put his own welfare as the priority, or it could be a
Nash bargaining process. We raise this issue here to make critical argument about
the surplus maximization in Rayo [2007]. When individuals’ surpluses enter their
IC constraints endogenously, utilities are no longer transferable. Which specific
target effort will be preferable depends on the social welfare function of the team,
thus we will leave the efficiency issue to the future study and focus on solving the
optimal contract first.
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Due to the budget balancing constraint, it’s impossible to increase every agent’s
share to 1. The problem is then how to derive an optimal sharing rule to create
the maximum surplus possible. We start by simplifying our IC constraints












1− δ p¯ii (4.13)
Proof. See Appendix B
Lemma (4.7) shows that instead of looking into the IC constraints agent by agent,
we can focus our attention on one constraint (4.13) and there always exist balanced
transfers on the constant payment β to make all individual IC constraints (4.6)
hold. In constraint (4.13), with the target effort level a given, the only term left




is the key to find the optimal sharing rule.
However, the procedure of searching for the optimal linear sharing rule needs to be
based on a given target effort level. It’s of interest to see under which conditions,
first-best outcome can always be implemented with any linear sharing rule. We
have the following theorem:
For any agent i, giving the sharing rule s and target effort level a∗, let a′i denote
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For each agent i, given his peer effort level ‘a∗−i the relation between the agent’s
best respond effort level a′i and his share of output αi is described by the Nash
equilibrium conditions. For given target effort level a, the optimal sharing rule
should try to satisfy IC constraint (4.13)










Since the RHS of each constraint (4.7) involves a maximization problem, where
a′i ∈ arg max[si(F(a′i, a−i))− ci(a′i)], we need to show that our objective function
is differentiable with respect to αi for all i
Lemma 4.8. Given a, for each agent i , the mapping αi → a′i is a function
differentiable on R+
Proof. See Appendix B
With lemma (4.8), we are able to analyze the impact of the sharing rule on IC
constraint through calculus.
Lemma 4.9. Given a, for each i the incentive power is increasing in his own
share αi.
Proof. See Appendix B
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Lemma 4.9 shows how the share α can influence the IC constraint and result is
very straightforward: given the amount of implicit incentive available, the higher
the explicit incentive, the more likely the effort level is implementable. However,
due to the budget balancing condition, we cannot increase every agent’s share to
100%. The optimal linear sharing would thus provide as much incentive power
as possible to fill in the ”incentive gap” left by the relational incentive. And we
would show in the following theorem that there is a best way to allocate agents’
shares.
Theorem 4.10. The optimal linear sharing rule s∗ given target effort level a∗
satisfies the following property: For each agent i, with the optimal share α∗i , the
optimal deviation output level must be the same, such that F(a′1, a∗−1) = · · · =
F(a′i, a∗−i) = · · · = F(a′n, a∗−n) = F¯
Proof. See Appendix B
Given the property that the implicit incentive can be shifted around agents without
fraction, the optimal sharing rule tends to minimize the sum of deviations among
all agents. Theorem 4.10 would make each agent deviate to the same output
level given his colleagues’ contribution fixed. This comes from the fact that if an
agent maximize it’s own payoff given others effort level, then the marginal effect
of changing this single agent’s share would be equal to the deviation output level
at the current share. Thus minimum is achieved when this marginal effect is the
same for everyone, providing no chance of further reducing the sum of deviation
by shifting shares among agents.
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Up to this point we have shown the property of the optimal linear sharing rule,
but there might exist other non-linear or abstract sharing rules that can achieve
a better outcome. Thus we need to extend our analysis to general sharing rules.
We would start by relaxing the linear constraint to consider other differentiable
sharing. Let θˆ denote the deviation output level, we would show that θˆ is uniquely
defined for any differentiable sharing rule.
Lemma 4.11. Given any differentiable sharing rule S = {s1(.), s2(.), . . . , sn(.)},
if θ′ arg max{si(θ)− vi(θ))} for all i, θ′ = θˆ.
Proof. See Appendix B
The lemma shows that under differentiable sharing, if we want each agent’s optimal
deviation output θ to be the same, then the deviation output is unique. Unlike
linear sharing, where the marginal change in share is constant for any output level
and has to sum up to 1 across all agents, non-linear sharing can have the flexibility
of having the marginal effect been summed up to other constants. Although with
the lemma non-linear sharing would be equivalent to linear sharing if the optimal
deviation is specified at θˆ. We need to further compare with other cases when
each agent’s optimal deviation output levels are different.







vi(θˆ), where for each i, θi arg max{si(θ)−vi(θi)}.
Proof. Since for each i, θi arg max{si(θ)−vi(θi)}. We have si(θ)−vi(θi) ≥ si(θˆ)−
vi(θˆ).
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vi(θˆ)}. Since the sharing rule is balanced,
n∑
i=1
{si(θˆ) = θˆ. The proof is complete.
Given our objective function as minimizing the sum of deviation benefits, theorem
4.12 shows that there does not exist any other differentiable sharing rule that can
give a better outcome than the optimal linear sharing. The inequality in 4.12
holds with equality if and only if for all i, θi = θˆ.
Example 4.2. Given a target effort level let gi(.) : ai → F(ai, a−i). If for all
i ∈ N , gi(.) = g(.), the optimal sharing rule must be symmetric for all agent, with
all agent getting the same proportion of share.
Given their peer effort level, if each agents’ roles in the production are homogenous,
by theorem 4.10, the optimal sharing rule must specify the same deviation output
level for all agents, thus the share for each agent must be the same.
Example 4.3. For a production technology, if for all i and any arbitrary a−i,
F(0, a−i) = 0, then all agents must receive strictly positive shares.
In the special case where every agent is indispensable in team production, they
must receive at least some incentive from the sharing to exert positive effort.
The above two examples show how the optimal linear sharing rule is related to the
production structure and the target effort level. In theorem 4.10 we investigated
the optimal sharing rule treating target effort level given. But whether the self-
enforcing constraint is fulfilled remains to be solved. The relation between the
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optimal linear sharing and optimal general sharing are not clear by far. We would
focus on comparing these two in the next section.
4.6 General verses linear sharing
In section 4.4, we showed that an effort vector a∗ and sharing of output (p1, . . . , pn)










condition hold any outcome (p1, . . . , pn) that satisfies pi ≥ p¯ii can be implemented.
While for linear sharing, from the previous section the optimality specifies every
agent’s optimal deviation as θˆ, thus the necessary and sufficient condition has to
be specific for each agent i such that:
αiθˆ + βi − vi(θˆ) ≤ 1
1− δ [αiF
∗ + βi − ci(a∗i )]−
δ
1− δ p¯ii (4.16)
It’s clear that with linear sharing, the validity of each of these individual con-
straints depends on both αi and βi. Unlike the general sharing, the distribution
of the outcome would not affect constraint 4.8. While for linear sharing, each
individual constraint will be affected through the alteration of betais, thus we do
not have the freedom to choose the distribution of output.
If we put the problem output distribution aside, the question we are interested in
is: if effort a∗ can be implemented by general sharing, can it also be implemented
by linear sharing with restrictions to the distribution of the output? The answer
lies within the inner relation between the two types of sharing.
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Let θ∗ ∈ arg max{θ −
n∑
i=1
vi(θ)}, the key question of comparison of the general
sharing with linear sharing lies in the comparison of the θ∗ specified by general
sharing and the θˆ specified by linear sharing.
Lemma 4.13. θ∗ = θˆ
Proof. See Appendix B
From lemma 4.13, we can see that the optimal deviations specified by general
sharing and linear sharing are the same. Thus the condition 4.8 with general
sharing can be treated as a summation of the n conditions specified by linear
sharing. With linear sharing, effort level a∗ can be implemented if and only if the
n conditions holds simultaneously and the choose of betais is important. We will
show in the following theorem the existence of beta that satisfies the individual
constraints with α.
Theorem 4.14. If a∗ can be implemented by general sharing, then there exist
some linear sharing rules that can implement a∗ with some βs.
Proof. See Appendix B
Note that the above theorem talked about the implementation of effort only. Due
to the simple nature of linear sharing, i.e. only two variables need to be fixed; we
are able to implement some effort in the same way as general sharing but with
limitations on the distribution of the outcome. For example, if condition 4.8 binds
with strict equality, then the vector β is unique and only one of the outcomes that
can be implemented by general sharing can be implemented by linear sharing.
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In this sense general sharing always dominates linear sharing. We can assume
linear sharing without loss of generality if and only if the social welfare function
within the team is the team surplus. We will use a numerical example to show the
difference of the two.
We would take a numerical example to further illustrate our result.
Example 4.4. Consider a team consists of agents 1, 2 and 3. Let a = {a1, a2, a3},












3 . Each agent’s cost function is defined as
follow: c1 = a
2
1/2, c2 = a
2
2/2, c3 = a
2
3. Suppose the sub-team structure satisfies the
condition in theorem 4.4. Let δ = 1
2
.3
In the above example, the first best effort level is a∗ = {1, 1, 1}, generating output





i ) = 2. Figure 4.1 plots θ −
n∑
i=1
vi(θ) against θ ∈
[2, 4]. From the graph, the maximum point 2.66 which is the ρ given a∗ = {1, 1, 1}
as the target effort level. According to theorem 4.6, the first-best effort can be




Also theorem 4.14 suggests that if first-best outcome can be implemented, it can be
implemented with linear sharing. Figure 4.2 plots the amount of implicit incentive
needed for all possible non-negative sharing. The minimum is obtained when linear
sharing specifies the shares as α = {0.235, 0.235, 0.53}. Since agent 1 and 2’s roles
are perfectly symmetric in this setting, the optimal linear sharing would give them
the same share. Theorem 4.14 proves that the minimum requirement for implicit
incentive under linear sharing is exactly the same as ρ. However, when using linear
sharing, some distribution of output levels cannot be supported. Given α and from
3A static case of this example can be found in Nandeibam [2002].
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Figure 4.1: Searching for ρ
the individual IC constraints we have for agent 1 and 2: 1
1−δ [0.235 ∗ 4 + β− 0.5] ≥
[0.235 ∗ (2√0.765 + 2) + β − 0.7652
2
] + pii, where 0.765 is agent 1 and 2’s optimal
effort level with sharing rule alone. we have β1 ≥ p¯i1− 0.3 and β2 ≥ p¯i2− 0.3. The
same reasoning with agent 3 we have β3 ≥ p¯i3 − 1. Thus if we try we implement
the first-best outcome with linear sharing rule, each agent’s surplus must satisfy
pi1 ≥ p¯i1 + 0.15, pi2 ≥ p¯i2 + 0.15 and pi3 ≥ p¯i3 + 0.11. While for general sharing, we
only need pii ≥ p¯ii for each i.
We can easily visualize the difference in figure 4.3, where an arbitrary point O
inside the big triangular represents a possible surplus distribution. Here we nor-
malize the outside options to 0. The distance O to each side of the big triangular
represents the surplus distributed to each agent. The shadowed area shows the im-
plementable outcome with linear sharing, while the general sharing can implement
both white and shadowed area. It’s clear that with linear sharing, it’s impossible
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to concentrate all the surplus to one agent and leaving the rest of the team getting
their outside options.






Figure 4.3: Distribution of surplus under general and linear sharing
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has studied team relational contract under with deterministic sub-
team performances. The two main questions we tried to answer are: firstly, how
can the information on sub-team performance be utilized to the maximum in
relational contracting (through the grouping mechanism that allocate agents to
different sub-teams); Secondly where the efficiency lies and what’s the role that
sharing rules can play.
In answering the first question we decompose the searching of the optimal rela-
tional incentive into two steps. In the first step, we have shown that there exists a
simple grouping mechanism such that any single deviation from any agent will be
perfectly detected within a proper subset of the agent set. This ensures that any-
one who deviates will be punished to the maximum while there always exist some
other agents to balance the budget. In the second step, we measure the maximum
amount of punishment can be enforced through the self-enforcing constraint.
The optimal implicit incentive suggests that the incentive power from relational
incentive only depends on the surplus of the team on the equilibrium path. Given
a target effort, we show the necessary and sufficient condition for a target effort
vector can be supported with the combination of balanced sharing rule with re-
lational contract. Under general setting, agent’s utilities are transferable, namely
any distributional objective can be implemented.
However, under linear sharing rule, we are only able to implement the efficient
effort vector under certain range of distribution of surplus. This is due to the
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fact that only two parameters are involved in determining an agent’s share. Once
the optimality fixed the slope of the linear function, we can no longer change the
constant freely, resulting in the failure of implementation of some outcomes.
Chapter 5
A Bayesian Approach to Linear
Public Good Games
5.1 Introduction
In previous chapters we study the team incentives in monetary terms, however
experimental studies have shown that humans do not always behave in a ratio-
nal way to maximize their monetary payoffs. In the dictator game investigated
by Forsythe et al. [1994], the average gift sent out by dictators is 20%. Fehr et al.
[1993] also shows that people tries to be behave nicely to others at their own costs
and expect the same in return. All these experiments suggest that good outcome
can be achieved without monetary incentives and people’s social preferences play
the key role in people’s counter-theoretical behaviors. In this chapter we would
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give some preliminary analysis on the theory of inequality aversion, in order to
build up the base for future theoretical and experimental analysis.
Although we do find people’s preferences towards equal outcome, people will not
always have enough information to convince themselves to pursue the ”good”
equality. Especially when their decision have to be made upon strict assumptions
upon others. A vivid example is established by Fehr and Schmidt [1999], through
comparing the outcome of linear public good experiments with and without pun-
ishment. When subjects are asked to contribute towards a linear public good
simultaneously, more than a half chooses to contribute nothing. However, when
punishment is allowed after the result is revealed, the majorities contribute fully
towards the public good. The results suggest that people do care about equality:
If they are selfish, no one should choose to punish free-riders at his own cost, when
this punishment cannot change the outcome of the public good game. Moreover, it
suggests that people also believe other people are averse to inequality: convinced
that free-riders will be punished in the second stage, most subjects contribute
fully.
Two key questions arises in the theory explanation of Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s
model. First, Fehr and Schmidt [1999] assumes the subjects’ preferences over
inequality are public information. This is a very strong assumption given the
fact that most subjects shouldn’t know each other. Their result heavily relies on
this assumption. In this chapter we would assume incompleteness of information,
by the preference parameter is known only to each subject themselves, but the
distribution of the parameters are publicly known. We would derive the Bayesian
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Nash equilibriums of the linear public good game without punishment and have
a basic discussion about the punishment scheme adopted by Fehr and Schmidt
[1999].
The second question is: under the game without punishment, players would not
know the exact contribution vector, however, Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s inequality
aversion is still calculated based on the contribution vector. In fact, when players
are only able to observe the final output of the public good, the only inequality
they are able to derive is from the difference between their own payoff with the
average. We derived the theory to consider this situation and the equilibrium
behavior suggest that no matter a player is averse to inequality or not, if he believes
there are people who doesn’t care about inequality, he would not cooperate. This
explains the high proportion of 0 contributions in linear public good games without
punishment, but further experiments need to be conducted to test this idea.
In general this chapter aims to build the theory foundation for inequality aversion
that can be applied in incentive provision in team production. We try to develop
the theory base on Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s framework and shed light on some
future experimental studies.
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5.2 Linear public good model and inequality aver-
sion
We consider a linear public good model where individuals care about inequality.
Suppose there are n agents taking part in a project where the payoff of the project
is linear towards the sum of all agents’ contributions. We denote gi ∈ G as agent
i’s contribution and the action space G is a continuum identical to all agents. Let
the final payoff function be F = a
n∑
i=1
gi, with a < n. Let S be the sharing rule
among these agents and si describes the specific share for agent i. For each i,




Through out the chapter we assume each agent not only care about his own payoff
but also the inequality between each other. The modeling of inequality aversion
has two key elements: the measurement of inequalities based on publicly observable
information and the mapping relationship between the degree of inequality and
the agents’ averse feeling towards the inequality. The measurement of inequality
τ can vary from different public good games and will be discussed specifically in
each game setting. Let τij = xi−xj be a binary inequality measure on x1 for agent
i with agent j, we would take Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s approach by assuming
players’ preferences toward inequality are linear. For each i we have,
fi(τij) =

βiτij ifτij ≥ 0,
αiτij ifτij < 0
(5.1)
1Without loss of generality we assume agents’ utility functions are increasing on x.
Chapter 5. A bayesian approach to linear public good games 76
The inequality aversion structure in 5.1 states that subjects cares both advan-
tageous inequality and disadvantageous inequality. The degree of aversion/pref-
erence towards advantageous inequality and disadvantageous inequality are con-
trolled by parameter βi and αi respectively. Although the linear assumption might
not be fully realistic, it provides us an simplest possible structure to look into pub-
lic good games while being able to explain a lot of results in the public good game
experiments.
In standard linear public good game, the only inequality the subjects will face
would be the difference between the net profit through contributing to the public





gi − gi, τij = xi − xj = gj − gi. If n = 2, subject i’s utility






gi − gi − βi max{gj − gi, 0} − αi max{gi − gj, 0} (5.2)
If n > 2, then each player needs to compare himself with other n− 1 players, we
thus normalize the aversion towards inequality by taking the average across all
the n − 1 comparisons. This ensures the relative impact of inequality aversion is














max{gi − gj, 0}
(5.3)
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5.3 Incomplete information
Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s theory assumes that agents’ utility functions are het-
erogeneous in the sense that parameters α and β may vary across agents, and
the equilibrium behaviors are derived under the assumption that αis and βis are
publicly known to everyone. However it is a very strong and somehow unrealis-
tic assumption, especially under circumstances where subjects taking part in the
experiments are randomly chosen.
In this chapter we would propose a different approach towards the game and
try to explain the results of some previous findings from experiments. We relax
the assumption of complete information by assuming the parameters αis and βis
are privately known. While βis are independent and identically distributed over
(−γ, 1) with density function f(β). Here we assume independent distributions
because we believe subjects’ beliefs over β are formed over a much bigger sample
within some certain cultural environment rather than the small sample partici-
pating the experiment. Thus we do not provide the prior joint distribution over
(β1, . . . , βn), as knowing his/her own βi would not help agent i to infer other’s β.
Different β shows different preferences towards advantageous inequality:
• If −γ < β < 0, then subject would gain strictly positive utility from being
better off than others. The lower bound γ represents the maximum cost such
agent would be willing to pay to increase his advantageous inequality with
others.
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• If 0 ≤ β < 1
2
, then subject would have disutility from being better off than
others, while this feeling is not strong enough for him/her to transfer some
money to others to get equal outcome.
• If 1
2
≤ β < 1, then subject’s aversion towards advantageous inequality would
enable the subject transforming his money to others to pursue an equal
outcome. Here we rule out the case that β ≥ 1, as we assume that no
subject would throw money away to get a perfect equal outcome.
Under linear public good setting, the mechanism of monetary transfer is based on
the contribution to the public good, given gi < g−i, a marginal increase in gi would
decrease i’s monetary payoff by n−a
n
, while the average inequality between agent
i with other agents would decrease by 1. Thus in a two player linear public good
game, if subject i’s contribution is less than subject j, he would only increase his
contribution if and only if βi ≥ a−nn .
For parameter α which controls subject’s preference towards disadvantageous in-
equality, we would assume that for each i, αi ≥ max{0, βi}. The assumption
captures the following ideas: firstly, agents are always averse to disadvantageous
inequality; secondly, if an agent is averse to both types of inequality, he would
prefer advantageous inequality to disadvantageous inequality. Given βi, αi is dis-
tributed over [max{0, βi}, λ], with conditional density function h(αi|βi). To inter-
pret the meaning of the upper bound λ, let’s consider a case where player 1 offers
player 2 an opportunity to join a project where player 2 need to decide how much
he wish to invest. Suppose as the project leader player 1 always gets more than
player 2, and the net marginal payoff for player 2 from investing is always positive
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and we normalize it to 1, while the marginal payoff for player 1 from player 2’s
investment is x and x > 1. If player 2 doesn’t care about inequality he would
always participate in the project, as it’s beneficial to him. However, he would
reject the offer if α2 >
1
x−1 . By setting an upper bound for α we would rule out
the extreme case where agents would sacrifice their own benefits to avoid just tiny
amounts of disadvantageous inequality.
5.4 Bayesian Nash equilibrium in public good
game
Consider n > 2 players participating a public good game, each agent i has an
initial endowment y that can be invested into the public good. At the beginning
of the game, each agent simultaneously choose a contribution level gi ∈ [0, y].
The monetary payoff of the public good F is linearly dependent on the sum of
contributions gathered from the players, with F = a
n∑
i=1
gi, where a is a parameter
that can be controlled for during experiment and a < n. After the contributions
are gathered, the public good will be equally shared among all players, and the
anonymous contribution vector would be revealed.
Each player’s preference towards inequality is characterized by a two-dimensional
type vector θi = [αi; βi]. The utility function for each player i is:
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The equilibrium behavior is described by the following theorems:
Theorem 5.1. If βi < 1− an , with any αi ≥ |βi|, agent i with θi has a dominant
strategy to contribute gi = 0
Proof. See Appendix C
Theorem 5.1 shows that if the degree of aversion towards advantageous inequality
cannot off set the loss in monetary payoff through contribution, players would con-
tribute 0 no matter what others contributions are. Even if other players contribute
some positive amounts, inequality aversion would not help to provide incentive to
players who doesn’t care about inequality that much. While for players with β
higher than 1 − a
n
, whether there exist any positive contributions needs further
clarification.
Suppose Θ is the set such that if θi ∈ Θ, positive contribution is the best respond
to each other. Given all other players j such that θj ∈ Θ contribute strictly
positive amount g > 0. The payoff for player i contributing 0 ≤ gi ≤ g given the
number of contributors k is:






− 1)gi − αi(n− 1− k)
n− 1 gi −
βik
n− 1(g − gi) (5.5)
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, where 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
Let p = p(θ ∈ Θ), the probability we assign to each realization of k is Ckn−1pk(1−









(n− 1)pg + (a
n
− 1)gi − αi(1− p)gi − βip(g − gi)
It’s easy to show that player i would never contribute higher than g. The marginal
impact of increasing gi can be interpreted in the following way: first of all, a
marginal increase oin gi by ε would decrease the aversion towards expected advan-
tageous inequality by βipε, on the other hand it incurs a monetary cost (1− an)ε
and an increase in the aversion towards the expected disadvantageous inequality
αi(1 − p)ε. Since θi ∈ Θ, βip ≥ 1 − an + αi(1 − p) must hold. Rearranging in
inequality we have:
p ≥ αi + 1− a/n
αi + βi
(5.6)
Since 5.6 must hold for any [αi; βi] ∈ Θ, p ≥ sup{αi+1−a/nαi+βi }. Since βi ≥ 1− an , the
supremum is obtained under inf β and supα, given the property that αi ≥ βi for
all i, the problem is to find x and ys such that: Θ = {[α; β]‖x ≤ β ≤ alpha ≤ y}
and
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p ≥ y + 1− a/n
y + x
(5.7)






Remark 5.2. If any Bayesian Nash equilibrium with positive contribution exist, x
must be strictly greater than 1− a
n
It’s an obvious implication of the equilibrium structure of our game, that when
players are evaluating the expected number of players who are going to contribute
positive amount, players with β = 1 − a
n
will only contribute unless he think
everyone is going to contribute and of course this is not possible. In general only
players with high enough β and low enough α will be able to be incentivized
through inequality aversion.
The equilibrium behavior can be summarized as the following theorem:






} < 0, for any type of
agent θi, there is a unique equilibrium of contributing 0.
Otherwise, there exist Bayesian Nash equilibriums such that for each player i, if








gi = g ∈ [0, y]; if θi /∈ Θ, then gi = 0
Proof. See Appendix C
When players are informed about each others preferences over inequality, Fehr and
Schmidt [1999] divided the players into two groups, one group as the free riders
who have a dominant strategy to contribute 0 and all the other agents are grouped
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into the cooperators. And the existence of equilibrium such that cooperators
would contribute depends on whether the proportion of free-riders is small enough
and whether the cooperators’ αs are low enough. The equilibrium of our model
shares a very similar structure; we admit the existence of strict free-riders who
will free-ride on others contribution no matter what happens, while there might
exist cooperators who are willing to cooperate within themselves. The existence
of cooperators depends on the following conditions: first, any of such cooperators
must be averse enough towards free-riding while not been too upset about the
free-riders; second, the probability of a player satisfying this property needs to
be high enough. However, what Fehr and Schmidt [1999] has described is merely
a typical case of our theorem, where the boundary of cooperators’ α and βs are
fixed. Theorem 5.3 shows that the definition for cooperators can vary, there might
exist a set of combinations of x and y that satisfies the condition in the theorem.
It would be interesting to investigate this issue in the future with some specific
density functions of α and β.
5.5 Inequality aversion based on average
By far we have been strictly following Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s definition of in-
equality. Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s calculation of inequality is based on the contri-
bution vector even if it is not revealed in the linear public good experiment without
punishment. On one hand, individual’s strategy is formed under some predictions
of other’s possible action; on the other hand, when the contribution vector is not
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revealed at the end of the game, it’s not clear when making the decision, play-
ers would calculate his/her expected payoff based on individual contributions or
simply the average contribution he/she observes. Hence in this section, we would
discuss the equilibrium behavior under the other case when inequality aversion is
based on public information only. Given the final output of the public good F, let
g¯i be the average contribution of all other players excluding player i
Each player’s payoff function thus is defined as follows:






gi− gi− βi max{g¯i− gi, 0}−αi max{gi− g¯i, 0} (5.8)
It’s not difficult to show that under such circumstances, for agents with βi < 1− an ,
not contribute is still the dominant strategy. If any Bayesian Nash equilibrium with
positive contribution can be supported, the major difference in the equilibrium
behavior lies in the following theorem:
Theorem 5.4. Any positive contribution can be supported in a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if and only if p(βi < 1− an) = 0
Proof. See Appendix C
Theorem 5.4 shows that the equilibrium behavior would become completely dif-
ferent when changing the definition of inequality aversion. If the aversion towards
inequality is calculated based on average, players i will only contribute positive
amounts if and only if βi ≥ 1− an for all i. This is a much stricter assumption as
we not only require cooperators themselves satisfy β ≥ 1 − a
n
, they also need to
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be convinced that everyone else cares about inequality at least to some extent. In
general, if players are aware that there are players who don’t care about inequality
in the game, then the comparison of average will make the contribution converge
to 0. In a way this accords to the experimental findings that on average 73% of
subjects in standard linear public good game contribute 0.
When player’s contribution vector is not revealed, the condition for the existence
of positive contribution has to be very strong. Since people need to have good faith
on everyone who participate. While if the contribution vector is known afterwards,
players only need to judge whether the disutility from disadvantageous inequality
will dominate other feelings. Thus it’s not clear whether the increasing average
contribution when introducing a punishment scheme by Fehr et al. [1997] is due
to the punishment or revelation of the contribution vector.
5.6 Punishment scheme
In Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s extension towards linear public good experiment, they
introduced a punishment scheme such that the new game consists two stages: in
the first stage, the game is identical to the previous game; in the second stage, the
contribution vector (g1, . . . , gn) is revealed and each player i can simultaneously
impose a punishment on other players pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) where pij ≥ 0 denote
the punishment player i impose on player j. Each unit of punishment imposed by
player i incurs a cost to player i himself, which we denote by c and 0 < c < 1.
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Since Fehr and Schmidt [1999] assumes βi ≥ 0 for all player i, no player would
punish others just to make themselves better off than others.
Fehr et al. [1997]’s experimental result shows that about 80% of the subjects
contributed fully in the first stage, and free-riders did face a vast punishment from
majority of contributors in the second stage. Fehr and Schmidt [1999] provides the
theory explanation of how full cooperation can be sustained as a sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium. This requires: first of all, a norm specifying how much players
should contribute if they behave cooperatively; secondly, a credible punishment
strategy to enforce the contribution in the first stage.
By knowing each other’s utility functions, Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s punishment
strategy contains the following elements:
• A group of enforcers who have high βs and low αs. These enforcers are
very similar to the cooperators in the game without punishment; they care
sufficiently about advantageous inequality while not been too upset about
getting less than those non-enforcers. Only players satisfy this property can
make the punishment credible.
• The amount of punishment given the number of such enforcers. Since players’
incentive to conduct punishment comes from their aversion towards inequal-
ity, the punishment would make the defector and enforcers’ monetary payoffs
equal.
Intuitively Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s theory suggests that the incentive of an
enforcer to conduct punishment comes from two part: one is to get rid of the
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disadvantageous inequality with the defectors in the first stage, the other is to avoid
getting advantageous inequality with the other enforces. While the punishment
is at players’ own monetary cost as well as getting disadvantageous inequality
with non-enforcers. However, in Bayesian games it is very tricky to find a proper
punishment amount. Since everything is in expected terms, from an enforcers
point of view, the number of enforcers among the other n − 2 players (excluding
the defector) can vary from 0 to n − 2. Thus there exist situations of overly and
insufficient punishment. If we simply making the defector’s expected monetary
payoff the same as the enforcers, then it’s very difficult to analyze the effect of one
enforcer’s punishment on inequality (given other enforcers punish). We believe
punishment need to be designed very carefully based on the number of players n.
While in a simple extension, by assuming n is sufficiently large that we can ignore
the effect of inequality aversion towards a single defector. Then the model becomes
exactly the same with the game without punishment. Enforcers can be defined in
the same way as the cooperators in the previous sections. While by introducing
the punishment scheme we are able to utilize some agent’s inequality aversion to
regulate others. The experimental results by Fehr et al. [1997] do show the striking
change in the level of contribution once the punishment is allowed. Inspiring us
to create other ways to utilize inequality aversion in incentive provision.
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5.7 Conclusion and future work
In this chapter we did a preliminary study of linear public good games under in-
complete game theory framework, where each players are not aware of the true
preference parameters and can only infer other players actions based on a prior
distribution of player’s type. Unlike Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s model, when play-
ers’ preferences over inequality are privately known, the set of players that can be
incentivized through aversion towards inequality will be further restricted.
We showed that in in public good game without punishment, we are able to char-
acterize a group of cooperators who are willing to contribute among themselves.
The contributors shares similar properties with Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s model
with complete information. However, there exist more than one way to define
the contributors while Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s theory only provides one typical
case. Even if the condition in Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s model doesn’t hold, there
might exist other possible equilibrium with positive contributions.
We also point out that Fehr and Schmidt [1999]’s comparison across the games are
not very accurate. As in their public good game setting, the contribution vector
is not revealed when there is no punishment. We showed theoretically how the
equilibriums would differ when players compare the inequality on average base.
Thus there is need to test whether revealing the contribution vector would yield
different result in the public good game without punishment.
Throughout the theory we cannot rule out the existence of multi-equilibrium.
Theory simply suggests players will cooperate, but why players are cooperating in
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some typical way remain unanswered. In this sense inequality aversion can help
us when players have good faith upon others and it might not help at all under
extreme circumstances. Apparently we would like to see what could be done in the
later case to improve the efficiency. We can conduct possible linear public good
experiments where players share are not equal, with one player’s share greater
than 1
a
. It would be interesting to see how other agents will react under these
circumstances. On one hand, when one player’s action can be perfectly predicted,
other players would have information to predict other players contribution condi-
tional on their types. On the other hand, introducing inequality in the sharing
itself might bring disutility directly to the players. Thus it’s important to check




This dissertation analyses relational contracting in teams and the role inequality
aversion can play in incentive provision. Through out our analysis, information
plays an important role. How a piece of information can be utilized in incentive
provision relies crucially on its quality, i.e. whether the information is publicly
observable, does it contain any noise or is it at aggregate level or individual level.
Ideally we all wish to have perfect verifiable public information signals at individual
level so that we can easily solve the moral hazard problem. However, most real life
challenges are more complicated than the ideal situation and we need to search
for ways to mitigate the efficiency loss caused by information asymmetry.
We classify the information into two parts: the hard information, which is publicly
observable and can be verified by outsiders; the soft information that can only
be observed by agents who participate in production. If a piece of information
can be verified by outsiders, a contract written contingent on this information
90
Chapter 6. Conclusion 91
can be enforced by court, therefore everyone has to obey what’s been agreed.
However, if something is only known within the production team itself, there is no
way to enforce the agreements in a one shot game. Relational contract provides
us a mechanism to utilize the ”uncontractable” information in games that are
played infinitely repeatedly. If an agent should pay some money to the rest of
the team according to a non-court enforceable agreement and he regretted, then
the agent breaks the relationship and gets a one-time benefit from reneging. The
design of relational contract will need to make sure for all agents, maintaining
the relationship is more valuable than any short-term benefits. Here is where the
name ”relational contract” comes from.
Throughout the dissertation we assume the output of team production is verifi-
able, while the information structure varies across different models. In chapter 3
we first looked into a model with deterministic production and stochastic individ-
ual performance signals. We find that an aggregate deterministic output is strong
enough to conduct efficient punishment when the production game is played in-
finitely repeatedly. Intuitively, if the output is different to the output level under
pre-agreed effort, then we can be 100% sure that shirking occurs. Then trigger
strategy can be utilized to punish the whole group without further requirement of
finding out who shirks. We showed that under this setting, relational contracting
cannot do better than trigger strategy as the mechanism under these two kinds of
incentive provision are exactly the same: the threat of breaking the relationship.
Thus even when trigger strategy would not always be applicable,
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We further looked into non-deterministic production. We find out that the condi-
tions posed by Rayo [2007] are not sufficient to ensure the validity of first-oder
approach. However, we do justify the linear assumption made by Rayo [2007]
when the first-order approach is valid. Further extension has been made to include
negative sharing. We show that the optimal sharing structure is very different to
the case with non-negative sharing. If negative sharing is allowed, then there will
be one agent concentrating all the negative shares and make all other agents get-
ting the full share. However, the nature of relational contract suggests that, if an
agent receives no implicit incentive, then his/her surplus received would not affect
incentive provision. While for the agent receiving negative shares, he needs to be
motivated by large surplus from the production. We questioned ourselves what
should be our definition of the endogenous principal, receiving the full share or
getting the most surplus?
The previous question will be answered in chapter 4, where we pointed out a big
gap not been observed by Rayo [2007]. In chapter 4 we studied a model with
deterministic production and aggregate sub-team performances. We derived a
simple and applicable grouping mechanism under which we only need to maintain
some slight differences of sub-teams’ organizational structure to provide strong re-
lational incentives. We also present a simple one-step form of relational incentive
and proved the rationality of it. The rest of the chapter focuses on the efficiency
and sharing rules. We derived the necessary and sufficient condition for an out-
come to be implemented with general sharing and relational contract. For general
sharing we don’t impose any restriction on the functional form of agents’ shares,
Chapter 6. Conclusion 93
the sharing is specified point-wise.
The key contribution of the chapter 4 reveals the following property of linear
sharing in relational contracts. When agent’s surplus has endogenously become
part of the incentive provision in relational contract, linear sharing would not give
us the freedom to redistribute the team surplus. Thus Rayo [2007] cannot justify
his maximization of team’s surplus when assume linear sharing as there exist some
outcomes that would be strictly preferred by some agents while not maximizing the
team’s surplus. In chapter 4 we conclude that if the social welfare function is the
team’s total surplus, then it’s without loss to use linear sharing as linear sharing
can enforce the efficient effort level under certain range of distributions of surplus.
While linear sharing would not able to support extreme surplus distribution. Our
result is further supported by a numerical example.
After a detailed analysis based on models where agents are purely incentivized
through monetary payoffs, we turn our focus to inequality aversion in the fifth
chapter. We admit there are much more work to be done in this area, the aim
of our current research is to provide a view of inequality aversion models from
Bayesian game perspective. We conclude that the equilibrium behavior in linear
public good game hugely depends on how the inequality aversion is defined. We
further points out the complementary experiments need to be done to Fehr and
Schmidt [1999]’s model together with a suggestion of future study of our own
interest.
Appendix A
Proofs of results in chapter 3
Proof for lemma 3.2
Proof. Suppose the optimal contract generate per period average surplus s∗. For
an arbitrary optimal relational contract σ, suppose in each period t the contract
implements at and generate surplus st, with (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1st = s∗. We first show
the existence of a self-enforcing stationary contract that implements the initial
effort schedule a1 in each period generating per period average surplus as s1, then
we shall prove this contract is optimal.
Observe that s1 must be at lease as large as s∗, because otherwise there would
exist a history h1 and a contract σ′ that specifies the same action as σ, following
history h1 but one period in advance, creating a higher surplus than s∗
For each agent i and each period t, suppose σ specifies the sharing rule as sti and
the discretionary payment as pti, where p
t
i can depend on all pubic history. Let
94
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µi(l
1, y1) denote the expected continuation payoffs achieved under σ from period
2 onwards.
In the first period, σ must satisfy the following constraints:
For each i
s1i (f(a
1))− c(a1i ) + E[p1(l1, y1)|a1] + δµi(l1, y1),














p1(l1, y1) ≥ δ
1− δ p¯ii (A.2)
Now define the new discretionary payment as pˆ = p1 + δµi(l
1, y1)− δµi(l1, y1|a1)).
The idea is to move all the possible variation in the continuation payoffs into the
discretionary payment in the current period. Let the new stationary contract σˆ
propose sharing rule s1i and discretionary payment pˆ in each period. It’s easy to
verify the IC constraint remain the same, thus effort level a1 can be implemented
while generating surplus s1 in each period.





1− δ p¯ii (A.3)
Given s1 ≥ s∗, we would have
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δ
1− δ s
1 ≥ δµi(l1, y1|a1) (A.4)
(A.4) and (A.2) directly implies (A.3), thus σˆ is self-enforcing.
The existence of σˆ implies s1 ≤ s∗, because otherwise σˆ would generate a per
period average surplus greater than σ which is already optimal. Since s1 ≥ s∗, we
must have s1 = s∗. Thus the stationary contract σˆ is optimal.
Proof for theorem 3.3
Proof. For initiation of the production, team members’ individual rationality con-
straints must be satisfied for any feasible sharing rule s:
si(y(aˆ))− c(aˆi) ≥ p¯ii (A.5)
We will show that the contract is incentive compatible:
For any i, since aˆ is the first-best effort level, aˆ maximizes y(a) −∑ ci. For all
ai > aˆi. The following inequality hold:
y(aˆ)− ci(aˆi)−
∑
c−i(aˆ−i) > y(a, aˆ−i)− ci(a)−
∑
c−i(aˆ−i)
which is equivalent to:
y(aˆ)− ci(aˆi) > y(a, aˆ−i)− ci(a) (A.6)
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Thus team member’s have no incentive to take effort level higher than aˆ.
If agent i renege and take effort level ai < aˆi, since the output is increasing in a,
y(ai, aˆ−i) < y(aˆ), the relationship will end from the beginning of the next period.
To ensure the agent cannot get more under ai, we require that pii(aˆ) +
δ
1−δpii(aˆ) ≥
pii(ai, aˆ−i) + δ1−δ p¯ii, for sufficient large discount factor, the inequality should hold if
for all individual, IR constraints hold with strict inequality, and this can be done
by adjusting the constant payment in sharing rules( Levin [2003]).
Proof for theorem 3.4
Proof. Suppose the optimal relational contract specifies the payment function for
each agent i as (si, pi). We construct a contract with trigger strategy as follows:




t) + E[pi|a∗] if yt = y(a∗)
si(y
t) if yt 6= y(a∗)
, and trigger strategy is described by:
dti =

1 if yt−1 ≥ y(a∗)
0 if yt−1 < y(a∗)
if y = y(a∗) then the production continues in the next period, if not then there will
be no production in the next period and every agent receive their outside options.
We then show the contract with trigger strategy is incentive compatible.
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From the assumption that a∗ can be implement by a relational contract, we have
for each agent i, si(y(a
∗))+E[pi|a∗] ≥ si(y(a′i, a∗−i))+E[pi|a′i, a∗−i] ≥ si(y(a′i, a∗−i))+
inf pi,The self-enforcing constraint suggests, inf pi ≥ δ1−δ (p¯i − pi∗), so we have
si(y(a
∗))+E[pi|a∗] ≥ si(y(a′i, a∗−i))+ δ1−δ (p¯i−pi∗), rearranging the equation we can
show that the IC constraint for the trigger strategy contract holds: si(y(a
∗)) +
E[pi|a∗] + δ1−δpi∗ ≥ si(y(a′i, a∗−i)) + δ1−δ p¯i
Proof for theorem 3.6
Proof. We would first check that the first order condition hold with the new linear
sharing rule:
For each i, the discretionary payment gi(l) remains the same. Thus reneging
constraint will not be affected. Moreover It’s easy to check that IC constraint is
exactly the same on a∗.
We then show that the linear sharing rule is balanced. Since the original sharing
rule balanced the budget, we have, for each y
n∑
i=1
si(y) = y (A.7)
From the linearity of expectations, we have
n∑
i=1
E[si(y)|a∗] = E[y|a∗] (A.8)
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By setting βi = (E[fi(y)|a∗])−f ′iE[y|a∗]E[y|a∗] we ensure that each agent receives
the same expected surplus from the linear sharing rule from the original contract.
Proof for lemma 3.7
Proof. If all agent has the same marginal rate of substitution between explicit and
implicit incentive, as the total shares among agents need to sum up to 1, the sum
of implicit incentive among agents thus will be the same for any linear sharing
rule. The sharing rule will have no impact on the self-enforcing constraint. Thus
in this case, all linear sharing is optimal.
Proof for lemma 3.8
Proof. Since ∂vi
∂αi
= −(E[y|a∗])′/τ ′ is constant given a∗,
∂hi
∂αi
= (E[y|a∗])′′ − (E[y|a∗])′
τ ′ τ
′′ is invariant with respect to the share αi
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Proof for theorem 3.9






, it’s always optimal
to decrease αi and raise αj to the maximum, such that the sum of implicit incentive
power of the two agents will be minimized. Thus for n > 2 agents, to minimize the
implicit incentive needed, it’s always optimal to decrease the share for agents with
minimum marginal rate of substitution and raise the share for all other agents to
1.
Appendix B
Proofs of results in chapter 4
Proof for lemma 4.2
Proof. Suppose the optimal contract generate per period average surplus s∗. For
an arbitrary optimal relational contract σ, suppose in each period t the contract
implements at and generate surplus st, with (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1st = s∗. We first show
the existence of a self-enforcing stationary contract that implements the initial
effort schedule a1 in each period generating per period average surplus as s1, then
we shall prove this contract is optimal.
Observe that s1 must be at lease as large as s∗, because otherwise there would
exist a history h1 and a contract σ′ that specifies the same action as σ, following
history h1 but one period in advance, creating a higher surplus than s∗
For each agent i and each period t, suppose σ specifies the sharing rule as sti
and the discretionary payment as pti, where p
t
i can depend on all pubic history.
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1), . . . , f 1m(a
1)) denote the continuation payoffs achieved under σ from
period 2 onwards.
In the first period, σ must satisfy the following constraints:
For each i
s1i (F(a1])− c(a1i )) + p1(f 11 (a1), . . . , f 1m(a1)) + δµi(f 11 (a1), . . . , f 1m(a1)),














p1(f1, . . . , fm) + δµi(f1, . . . , fm) ≥ δ
1− δ p¯ii (B.2)
Now define the new discretionary payment as pˆ(f1, . . . , fm) = p
1(f1, . . . , fm) +
δµi(f1, . . . , fm) − δµi(f 11 (a1), . . . , f 1m(a1)). The idea is to move all the possible
variation in the continuation payoffs into the discretionary payment in the current
period. Let the new stationary contract σˆ propose sharing rule s1i and discretionary
payment pˆ in each period. It’s easy to verify the IC constraint remain the same,
thus effort level a1 can be implemented while generating surplus s1 in each period.
If the stationary contract σˆ is self-enforcing, we must have:




1− δ p¯ii (B.3)
Given s1 ≥ s∗, we would have
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δ
1− δ s
1 ≥ δµi(f 11 (a1), . . . , f 1m(a1)) (B.4)
(B.4) and (B.2) directly implies (B.3), thus σˆ is self-enforcing.
The existence of σˆ implies s1 ≤ s∗, because otherwise σˆ would generate a per
period average surplus greater than σ which is already optimal. Since s1 ≥ s∗, we
must have s1 = s∗. Thus the stationary contract σˆ is optimal.
Proof for theorem 4.5
Proof. The payment function 4.5 states the following:
If no one deviate in effort, then hG(f1, . . . , fm) = ∅ and every agent’s discretionary
payment will be 0.
If deviation occurs then all agent who are detected by the monitoring scheme will
receive a punishment δ
1−δ (p¯ii − pii) which binds the self-enforcing constraint. All
the other agents will then receive payment wi(h) to balance the budget. Perfect
monitoring scheme ensures two properties: 1. any agent who deviate will be
receiving punishment. 2. For any unilateral deviation, there are always agents
who will not be punished that can balance the budget.
With discretionary payment function (4.5), for any agent i, his IC constraint can
be written as:
si(F(ai, a−i))− ci(ai) ≥ si(F(a′i, a−i))− ci(a′i) +
δ
1− δ (p¯ii − pii)
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Rearranging the equation we have:
si(F(ai, a−i))− si(F(a′i, a−i))−
δ
1− δ (p¯ii − pii) ≥ c(ai)− ci(a
′
i)
We denote the LHS of the above equation as incentive power. To prove (4.5)
is optimal, we shall show that for any deviation in effort, there exist no other
payment functions that creates higher incentive power.
For any agent i given si and a and p
′
i that satisfies the self-enforcing constraint,
the incentive power for any deviation:
si(F(ai, a−i))− si(F(a′i, a−i))− p′i(a′i, a−i)
≤si(F(ai, a−i))− si(F(a′i, a−i))− inf p′i
≤si(F(ai, a−i))− si(F(a′i, a−i))−
δ
1− δ (p¯ii − pii)
, which completes the proof.
Proof for lemma 4.8
Proof. The relation of αi and a
′
i can be described by the following first order
condition: αiF ′(a′i, a−i)− c′(a′i) = 0
Hence αi can be expressed as a function of a
′
i, where αi =
c′(a′i)
F ′(a′i,a−i) . Since
both F and c are twice differentiable on a′i, αi is differentiable on a′i and dαida′i =
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c′′(a′i)f
′(a′i)−c′(a′i)f ′′(a′i)
(F ′(a′i))2 , given the strict convexity of the cost function c(.) and the
strict concavity of the production function F(.), dαi
da′i
> 0.
Thus the mapping a′i → αi is a one to one differentiable function on R+, and we
have the inverse mapping αi → a′i is differentiable on R+ l
Proof for lemma 4.9
Proof. Rearrange the IC constraint to make all terms related to αi to be in the
LHS, we have 1
1−δ [si(F(ai, a−1))− c(ai)]− [si(F(a′i, a−1))− c(a′i)] ≥ δ1−δ p¯ii, where
a′i ∈ arg max[si(F(a′i, a−1)) − c(a′i)]. Based on lemma (4.8), we differentiate the
LHS of the inequality with respect to αi and have:

















=F(a)/1− δ −F(a′i, a−i)
>0
(B.5)
Thus, the larger the αi, the larger
1
1−δ [si(F(ai, a−1))−c(ai)]−[si(F(a′i, a−1))−c(a′i)]
and thus the inequality would be more likely to hold.
Proof for lemma 4.7
Proof. Necessity: It’s directly shown by summing up all agents’ IC constraints
together.
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Sufficiency: If inequality (4.13) holds but for some agents, the IC constraints do
not hold, it’s always possible to transfer some fixed payment β from other agents
whose IC constraints hold with strict inequality such that inequality (4.13) will
not be influenced and all IC constrains will hold.
Proof for theorem 4.10
Proof. Kuhn-Tucker first order condition for problem (4.15) suggest that: for all
i whose deviation effort a′i > 0, we have:











+ λ = 0
, where λ is the Lagrangeun mutiplier for budget balancing constraint. For all





= 0, which directly implies F(a′i, a−i) =
−λ.
Suppose s∗ is optimal, if with s∗ every agent’s deviation effort a′i > 0, then theorem
holds from the Kuhn-Tucker first order condition. If for some agents a′i = 0, we
need to prove for each of these agents, F(a′i, a−i) must be the same as everyone
else.
Let F∗ denote the deviation output level for all agents with a′i > 0. For an
arbitrary agent j, with a′j = 0;
If F(0, a−i) > F∗, a marginal decrease in αj would decrease the objective function
by F(0, a−i), while for all other agents whose target effort level is positive, a same
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marginal increase in αi would increase the objective function by F∗, thus the value
objective function can be further reduced by shifting such agents’ share down.
If F(0, a−i) < F∗, for the same reasoning the objective function is not at the
minimum level since raising agent j’s share without breaking the budget constraint
will reduce the value of the objective function.
Hence for any agent j whose a′j = 0, we must have F(0, a−i) = F∗
Proof for lemma 4.11















′) = 1. If θ′ 6= θˆ, then there exist another balanced linear
sharing such that α′i = s
′
i(θ
′) making every agent deviate to θ′. Since, v′i(θ) is
strictly increasing with θ for each i,
n∑
i=1
α′i 6= 1 which contradict to the previous
condition. Thus θ′ = θˆ.
Proof for lemma 4.13
Proof. Since θ∗ ∈ arg max{θ −
n∑
i=1
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For each i, let ai(θ























αi = 1. We can also show that with αi, each agent i’s
optimal deviation will be θ∗.
With αi, each agent solves for αiθ(ai) − ci(ai) and the FOC: αiθ′(a) − c′i(ai) = 0
holds on a∗i .
From lemma 4.11, when each agent i’s optimal deviation level is the same, then
this deviation output is uniquely defined as θˆ. So we have θˆ = θ∗
Proof for theorem 4.14














Define αi as what we did in the proof of lemma 4.13. We can ensure θ
∗ maximize
αiθ − vi(θ) for each i.
Given β = (βi, . . . , βn), with
n∑
i=1
βi = 0, if
αiθ
∗ + βi − ci(ai) ≥ 1
1− δ [αiF
∗ + βi − ci(a∗)]− δ
1− δ p¯ii
Define Di as the difference of LHS and RHS on the above inequality, we can write
Di = − δ1−δβi + Ci, where Ci is the constant
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αiθ
∗ − ci(ai)− 1
1− δ [αiF
∗ − ci(a∗)] + δ
1− δ p¯ii
Since 0 < δ < 1, Di is strictly decreasing with βi for all i with the same marginal
rate across all agent i. For all i with Di > 0, take 4βi = 1−δδ Di, we alter βi such
that with β′i = βi +4βi, we have D′i = 0
If we do the same with for each j of the rest of the agents with Dj ≤ 0, we must
have |∑4βj| ≥ |∑4βi|, suggesting that if we transfer −∑4βi to agents with
Dj ≤ 0, we can ensure
∑
D′j ≤ 0 while D′i = 0 for all i.
If any D′j > 0, repeat the above steps we can ensure Di ≤ 0 for all agents.
Appendix C
Proofs of results in chapter 5
Proof for theorem 5.1
Proof. Without loss of generality we label i as 1, consider an arbitrary contribution
vector (g2, . . . , gn) of other players. Suppose β1 < 1− an , if player 1 contribute 0,
his utility function is given as:










If player 1 contribute g1 > 0, we could have the following three situations:
1. If g1 ≤ min{g2, . . . , gn}, we have












(gi − g1) (C.2)
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, rearranging the terms we have: U1(g1 > 0) = U1(g1 = 0) + (
a
n
− 1 + β1)g1. Since
β1 < 1− an , we have U1(g1 > 0) < U1(g1 = 0)
2. If min{g2, . . . , gn} < g1 ≤ max{g2, . . . , gn}, let M = {i|gi < g1} and N =
{j|gj ≥ g1, j > 1} and let k denote the number of elements in M , we have

















If α1 ≥ β1 ≥ 0, then













































=U1(g1 = 0) + (
a
n
− 1 + β1)g1
< U1(g1 = 0)
If α1 ≥ 0 > β1, then it’s straight forward that the agent 1’s payoff is strictly
decreasing with his contribution g1 as contributing will decrease his advantageous
inequality and increase his disadvantageous inequality with other agents.
3. If g1 > max{g2, . . . , gn}, we have
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=U1(g1 = 0) + (
a
n
− 1 + β1)g1
<U1(g1 = 0)
Therefore, if β1 < 1− an , U1(g1 > 0) < U1(g1 = 0) for any (g2, . . . , gn).
Proof for theorem 5.3






} < 0, then there doesn’t exist any
interval [x, y] such that P (x ≤ β ≤ α ≤ y) ≥ y+1−a/n
y+x
, then there doesn’t exist a
strategy that can support positive contributions for certain types of players.
We have shown that condition 5.7 must hold if any player with type θi ∈ Θ’s best
respond is to contributing g, if other players with θj ∈ Θ are contributing g. Here
we would show that the inequality must hold with equality.
Given x and y, if P (x ≤ β ≤ α ≤ y) ≥ y+1−a/n
y+x
hold with strict inequality, we
would be able to find some players such that β∗ = x while α∗ > y such that




. Since P (x ≤ β ≤ α ≤ y) is increasing
in y and decreasing in x, P (β∗ ≤ β ≤ α ≤ α∗) ≥ P (x ≤ β ≤ α ≤ y). Suggesting
player with [α∗; β∗] should have incentive to contribute g as well which contradict
to the fact that [α∗; β∗] /∈ Θ
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Proof for theorem 5.4
Proof. Sufficiency: If βi > 1 − an for all i, then for any symmetric contribution
vector with gi = g ∈ [0, y] can be supported as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For
any player i, if all the other players contribute g, we have g¯i = g. Since βi ≥ 1− an ,
player i the marginal benefit from contributing less is always less or equal to the
marginal disutility from inequality aversion. While any contribution higher than
g would give the player strictly less utility as contribution is costly and players are
averse to disadvantageous inequality.
Necessity: If the following strategy: For each player: if player i’s type θi ∈ Θ, then
gi = g > 0, otherwise gi = 0 forms a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then the
expected payoff when player i’s type θi ∈ Θ and contributing g must be greater or
equal to the expected payoff when player i’s type θi ∈ Θ and contributing other
g′. Under this strategy, we have E[g¯i] = p(θi ∈ Θ)g.
Since αi ≥ βi > 0, g shall never be greater than E[g¯i]. On the other hand E[g¯i] =
p(θi ∈ Θ)g ≤ g. If g can be supported in the equilibrium, then g = p(θi ∈ Θ)g.
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